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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
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THE APPELLATE PROCESS IN CIVIL
CASES: A PROPOSED MODEL
ROBERT J. MARTINEAU*
I. INTRODUCTION
The appellate process - that process by which an action
of a trial court is reviewed in an appellate court' - was con-
sistently ignored as a-subject of scrutiny by those concerned
with the legal process. Notwithstanding the number of ap-
peals which have involved issues relating to the appellate pro-
cess, little attention was given it by the academic community.
For a long time only Roscoe Pound of Harvard,2 Edson R.
Sunderland of Michigan3 and Lester Orfield of Nebraska,4 de-
voted any substantial attention to the appellate process, ex-
cept as it related to the United States Supreme Court.5 In the
past decade, however, the appellate process has been a major
focus of those concerned with the courts and their role in the
legal system. There are several reasons for this change, most
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law.
B.S., College of the Holy Cross, 1956; J.D., University of Chicago, 1959. Reporter,
Wisconsin Judicial Council Committee on Appellate Practice and Procedure (1976-
78); Director of Appellate Court Studies for the Institute of Judicial Administration
(1970-72).
1. D. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME 1-
2 (1974) [hereinafter cited as MEADOR].
2. R. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES (1940).
3. Sunderland, A Simplified System of Appellate Procedure, 17 TENN. L. REV.
651 (1943); Sunderland, Improvement of Appellate Procedure, 26 IOWA L. REv. 3
(1940); Sunderland, The Problem of Appellate Review, 5 TEX. L. REV. 126 (1926);
Sunderland, The Proper Function of an Appellate Court, 5 IND. L. J. 483 (1930).
Professor Sunderland also served as chairman of the Committee on Simplification
and Improvement of Appellate Practice, Section of Judicial Administration, Ameri-
can Bar Association, in the late 1930's.
4. L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA (1939); Orfield, Appellate Procedure
in Equity Cases: A Guide for Appeals at Law, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 563 (1942).
5. For a brief resume of efforts to improve the appellate process prior to 1960 see
MEADOR, supra note 1, at 4-7.
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of which are applicable to the increased interest in judicial ad-
ministration in general. The litigation explosion, the ex-
panding role of courts in our society, the increased number of
lawyers, and the enlargement of constitutional and legal rights
have all contributed to the number of cases filed in the courts
and the number of appeals taken from decisions at the trial
court level. The increase in the number of appeals has caused
substantial backlogs in appellate courts and delays in the ap-
pellate process, with resulting concern over the structure of
the appellate court system, appealability, the cost of taking an
appeal, practice and procedure before appellate courts, inter-
nal operating procedures of appellate courts, and the publica-
tion of opinions.
In recent years an outpouring of books, articles, studies,
reports, standards and proposals have addressed one or more
of these problems, all designed to improve some aspect of the
appellate process. There has not been, however, any single ef-
fort to develop a comprehensive approach to the appellate
process so that the effect of one step in the process can be
weighed against the others.7 A systems analysis of the appel-
late process would permit it to be viewed as a single, unitary
system from beginning to end, with each step examined both
individually and as part of the whole. 8 The purpose of this
article is to provide such an analysis. Each aspect of the ap-
pellate process will be viewed, the various alternatives dis-
cussed, and a recommendation made. The sum of all the rec-
ommendations will offer a model for studying existing
appellate systems and analyzing proposed changes in them.
II. THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF APPELLATE COURTS
The first question in a study of the appellate process is
6. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL chs. 5-6
(1976) [hereinafter cited as JUSTICE ON APPEAL]; Hopkins, The Winds of Change: New
Styles in the Appellate Process, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 649-50 (1975).
7. The closest to a comprehensive effort has been by the American Bar Associa-
tion's Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration Relating to Appellate
Courts in 1977. This work does not, however, cover those matters usually dealt with
in rules of appellate procedure.
8. D. CLELAND & W. KING, SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT 10-14
(1968); P. DRUCKER, MANAGEMENT: TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, PRACTICES 592-98 (1974).
See generally, R. JOHNSON, R. KAST & J. ROSENZWEIG, THE THEORY AND MANAGEMENT
OF SYSTEMS (2d ed. 1967).
[Vol. 63:163
APPELLATE PROCESS
whether a system of appellate review is necessary. For most
persons that question is almost rhetorical, there being no
doubt that appellate review is essential to the proper func-
tioning of a judicial system. Chief Judge John Parker has
stated:
The judicial function in its essence is the application of the
rules and standards of organized society to the settlement of
controversies, and for there to be any proper administration
of justice these rules and standards must be applied, not
only impartially, but also objectively and uniformly through-
out the territory of the state. This requires that decisions of
trial courts be subjected to review by a panel of judges who
are removed from the heat engendered by the trial and are
consequently in a position to take a more objective view of
the questions there raised to maintain uniformity of decision
throughout the territory.9
Under this view, appellate review is necessary to obtain
uniformity, and uniformity is necessary for the proper func-
tioning of a judicial system. Appellate review has never been
held essential to due process, as all encompassing as that doc-
trine has otherwise become.10 In the American experience
there was only one period in one state in which there was no
appellate review, and the principal reason for the abandon-
ment of that experiment was the lack of uniformity in trial
court decisions.11 Even countries outside of the common-law
tradition have provided for some type of appellate review,
often more extensive than our own.12
A reasoned argument has been made, however, for the abo-
lition of appeals in civil cases.1 3 According to this argument,
appellate courts are no more likely than trial courts to pro-
duce decisions which are just, correct or consonant with the
law or more helpful in its development. Uniformity of decision
9. Parker, Improving Appellate Methods, 25 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (1950) [hereinafter
cited as Parker].
10. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (criminal case); National Union of Marine
Cooks v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37 (1954) (civil case).
11. Lamar, A Unique and Unfamiliar Chapter in Our American Legal History,
10 A.B.A. J. 513 (1924).
12. Sunderland, Improvement of Appellate Procedure, 26 IOWA L. REv. 8-9
(1940).
13. Wilner, Civil Appeals: Are They Useful in the Administration of Justice? 56
GEo. L.J. 417 (1968).
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is also no more certain with appellate courts than without be-
cause of the unreviewability of most fact determinations,
which can have a greater effect upon the outcome of a case
than any ruling of law. A final criticism of appellate courts
concerns their role in making law. This function, it is argued,
is ill-served by the case-by-case method; it would be better to
have all substantive law made by legislators, thus eliminating
the needs of the immediate parties from the development of
legal principles which will bind all others. This argument rec-
ognizes the principle that hard cases do make bad law and
rejects the process from which that principle emerged.
This analysis, while thought-provoking and original, ap-
pears to go too far. There may be good reason to doubt the
ability of three appellate judges to render a more correct or
more just decision than one trial judge, but the universality of
appellate review in the legal systems of the world has signifi-
cant implications. A recognized need exists to test the decision
of a judge at a higher level, without statistical evidence that a
second decision is any better than the first. This need is satis-
fied by our appellate system, and there appears to be little
prospect of eliminating or even modifying it.
The notion that all lawmaking should be done in a nonad-
versary process has even less merit. Aside from the historical
fact that our legal system has been built upon a different pre-
mise, it is unrealistic to think that all law can be developed in
an exclusively legislative setting, with the adjudicative process
designed solely to apply the law made by the legislative body.
Courts must still interpret and apply the law and must fill in
the many gaps left by the legislature, both in the statutes
themselves and in areas not covered by statute. The legisla-
ture is free at any time, of course, to enact statutes replacing
the common law developed by judicial decision. But courts
will continue to make law, whether or not there is any statute
covering the field.
Although there is little disagreement on the need for ap-
pellate review, there is more dispute as to its purposes. It is
common practice now to list two principal functions of the ap-
pellate process: (1) error correction and (2) law development. 14
14. C. JOINER, THE FUNCTION OF THE APPELLATE SYSTEM IN JUSTICE IN THE STATES
97, 102 (1971); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL
[Vol. 63:163
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There are some authors who add one or more functions, usu-
ally subdivisons or refinements of the two principal ones. 15
There is more disagreement on the extent to which appellate
courts should attempt to do justice between the parties in the
individual case.
It is, of course, the ultimate objective of any legal system
to do justice. But doing justice in the individual case is not
necessarily the same as justice viewed from the wider perspec-
tive of society."' The issue arises in the context of both the
ADMINISTRATION RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS, § 3.00 (Commentary) (1977) [here-
inafter cited as ABA STANDARDS]; JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra, note 6, at chs. 2-4.
15. R. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 3 (1940):
(1) review of the process of ascertaining facts, (2) review of the finding of the
applicable law, (3) review of the application of the law to the found facts, and
(4) in the common-law system, authoritative ascertainment and declaration of
a legal precept for such cases as the one in hand, where none has been clearly
promulgated.
Hufstedler, Constitutional Revision and Appellate Court Decongestants, 44
WASH. L. REV. 577, 587 (1969): "Appellate courts exist to formulate policy and prece-
dent, to assure uniformity in the administration of justice, to provide executive direc-
tion and assistance to the trial courts, and only incidentally, to see that justice is
done in any particular case."
Kurland, Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court: Time for a Change?
59 CORNELL L. REV. 616, 618 (1974):
Any appellate court has at least three distinct functions to perform. The first is
that of correcting erroneous decisions rendered by judicial tribunals inferior to
it in the judicial hierarchy. The second is to maintain a consistency among the
decisions of those lower courts subordinate to it, so that the law is evenhand-
edly applied within the system. The third is the lawmaking function of creat-
ing and amending rules of law, not only so that they may be followed by the
lower courts within the system, but also to provide guidance to lawyers and
their clients as to the propriety of their behavior, their obligations, their duties,
their rights, and their remedies.
Parker, supra note 9, at 1. "The function of the reviewing court is: (1) to see that
justice is done according to law in the cases that are brought before it, (2) to see that
justice is administered uniformly throughout the state, and (3) to give authoritative
expression to the developing body of law."'
16. Justice Tate of the Louisiana Supreme Court has stated:
The result that seems "just" for the present case must be a principled one
that will afford just results in similar conflicts of interest. This judge has an
initial human concern that the litigants receive common sense justice, but he
also realizes that the discipline of legal doctrine governs his determination of
the cause.
Tate, The Art of Brief Writing: What a Judge Wants to Read, 4 LITIGATION, Winter,
1978, at 11.
To the same effect is Heffernan, Briefs, Oral Arguments, and the Judicial Process
in the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in 4 W. HARVEY, WISCONSIN PRACTICE - CIVuL
PROCEDURE FORMS § 0.52 (1976).
1979]
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error correcting and law development functions. In cases in-
volving alleged errors by the trial court, the issue of justice
arises when the party complaining of error has failed to raise
the matter in accordance with the procedural rules of the ju-
risdiction. The appellate court is then faced with the decision
of whether to do justice in the case or adhere to its procedural
requirements. Different results are reached in different cases,
depending upon a variety of factors," but there does not ap-
pear to be any basis for predicting when a court will choose
one course over another. The issue of justice between the par-
ties arises in law development cases when a new legal princi-
ple is adopted to achieve a particular result, or when a new
legal principle is adopted and the question is whether it
should be made applicable to the case before the court or pro-
spectively only.1
In some jurisdictions the appellate court is mandated by
statutory provision to do justice between the parties.1 9 These
provisions are significant primarily because of their disuse. It
is unlikely that the actions of appellate courts in states with
such provisions are substantially different than in states with-
out them. Such a provision may, however, cause the appellate
judges to read the entire record rather than only those por-
tions of the record contained in the appendix or to which at-
tention is called by the parties.
The role of the appellate judge in "doing justice" has been
debated for centuries. It is a question of jurisprudence and of
judicial philosophy, and is far beyond the scope of this article.
While doing justice between the parties may not be among the
stated purposes of appellate courts, few judges are so removed
that they ignore the effect of their judgment upon the parties.
Often they will adopt a legal or factual interpretation that will
produce a "just" result in the particular case, while preserving
the integrity of the legal doctrine, statute or rule of procedure
17. The proper resolution of this question is discussed in section IV infra.
18. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961);
Schaefer, The Control of "Sunbursts": Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42
N.Y.U. L. REv. 631 (1967).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1976); 17 CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 909 (West 1977); 5 LA.
CODE CIV. PRO. ANN. art. 2164 (West 1976); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 5522 (McKinney
1977); Wis. STAT. § 752.35 (1977).
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involved. 20 Here, as in so many areas of the law, there is con-
stant balancing between the needs of the system with the
needs of the individual litigants.
III. STRUCTURE OF APPELLATE COURT SYSTEM
With two notable exceptions,21 American jurisdictions have
a single court at the peak of the appellate court structure. A
single supreme court is consistent with the notion of a unitary
judicial system and with the purposes of appellate courts, par-
ticularly uniformity. There is also a consensus that when the
caseload of the supreme court reaches a certain point, it is
necessary for an intermediate appellate court to be estab-
lished. 2 There is less agreement, however, on when a supreme
court has reached its maximum productivity, and whether the
creation of an intermediate appellate court will add to rather
than reduce delay in the appellate process. 23 Even when
agreement is reached on the necessity for an intermediate ap-
pellate court, there are differing views on what the jurisdiction
of the new court should be, how many judges it should have
and how the court should be organized. There is even disa-
greement on whether the court should be a single court com-
posed of panels sitting at one or more locations in the jurisdic-
tion or separate courts with separate geographical
jurisdictions. A subsidiary problem is the effect of the decision
of one panel of the court on other panels of the same court. 4
A. Effect of Caseload
At the heart of these questions is the more basic one of
how many cases an appellate judge can be expected to partici-
20. See note 16 supra.
21. Texas and Oklahoma each have a separate court of criminal appeals over
which the state supreme court has no jurisdiction.
22. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 14, at § 3.00 (Commentary); Hufstedler, Consti-
tutional Revision and Appellate Court Decongestants, 44 WASH. L. Rav. 577, 595
(1969).
23. M. OSTHUS & R. SHAPIRO, CONGESTION AND DELAY IN STATE APPELLATE COURTS
42-46 (1974); S. WAsBY, T. MARvELL, & A. AxuAN, VOLUME AND DELAY IN STATE AP-
PELLATE COURTS: PROBLEMS Am RESPONSES 51-52 (1979) [hereinafter cited as VOLUME
AND DELAY].
24. R. LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS 4 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as LEFLAR]; JUSTICE ON APPAL, supra note 6, at ch. 6; Hufstedler,
Constitutional Revision and Appellate Court Decongestants, 44 WASH. L. Rav. 577,
596-604 (1969).
1979]
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pate in each year. The answer to this question is not the same
for a supreme court justice as for a judge of an intermediate
appellate court. This is because when an intermediate appel-
late court is created, the two principal functions of appellate
courts, error correction and law development, are divided be-
tween the two appellate courts. Usually the supreme court re-
mains primarily responsible for law development and the in-
termediate court is concerned largely with error correction.
2 5
For example, when Wisconsin created an intermediate appel-
late court for the first time in 1978, it was concluded that a
caseload of approximately seventy cases per justice was too
great for a supreme court without an intermediate appellate
court, but for the intermediate appellate court approximately
one hundred cases per judge decided on the merits was not
too high.26 It was also anticipated that the supreme court,
which would perform only a law development function and
with discretionary jurisdiction only, would decide a total of
approximately one hundred fifty cases per year, about the
same number of cases in which the United States Supreme
Court issues written opinions each year.
In trying to develop the maximum number of appeals any
court can decide, the first point to be observed is that theoret-
ically there is no maximum on the number of cases in which
an appellate judge can participate. The significant variable is,
of course, how much time the judge will devote to each case.
Second, there is no maximum or minimum amount of time
that must be spent on each case. The time to be devoted to a
case depends upon its legal and social significance, its com-
plexity, the helpfulness of the briefs and oral argument, the
other demands placed upon the appellate judge, the internal
operating procedures of the appellate court and the availabil-
ity of staff assistance. The statistical evidence on this question
is inconclusive. There are wide variations between different
courts as to the number of cases decided each year27 and just
25. LEFLAR, supra note 24, at 63-64; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 14, at § 3.00
(Commentary).
26. Wisconsin Legislative Council Special Committee on Court Reorganization,
Working Document No. 3, Organization of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals (Rev.
1977).
27. W. KRAMER, COMPARATIVE OUTLINE OF BASIC APPELLATE COURT STRUCTURE AND
PROCEDURE IN THE UNITED STATES, Questions D-3 to D-5 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
[Vol. 63:163
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as wide variations between the caseloads which compel the
creation of additional judgeships or of an intermediate appel-
late court.
It is not surprising, consequently, that there have been few
efforts to establish the optimum caseload per judge for an ap-
pellate court of any type. 8 Those efforts that have been made
are not based on any in-depth empirical research and do not
purport to be definitive.29 When a jurisdiction is considering a
change of this nature, usually the current judges show how
their caseload has increased, examine existing backlogs and
compare the situation with that in comparable jurisdictions.
At the federal level, a committee of the United States Judicial
Conference develops criteria that it applies to each of the cir-
cuits to determine whether additional circuit judgeships are
needed. An interesting aspect of this process is the constantly
increasing number of cases per judge the federal appeals
courts have been expected to decide before an increase in the
number of judges is found to be justified. 0
Despite the lack of general uniformity in criteria, there ap-
pears to be a rough consensus that the maximum number of
majority opinions that a single justice can write in one year is
approximately forty.31 This number includes approximately
twenty short opinions of an error correcting nature, and ap-
proximately twenty opinions the principal purpose of which is
law development. Any workload beyond this, the judges be-
lieve, does not permit sufficient time to be spent on the major
KRAMER]; VOLUME AND DELAY, supra note 23.
28. In the foregoing discussion, the phrase "cases per judge" means cases termi-
nated as a result of judicial action including a full or memorandum opinion or order
either on the merits or on a procedural issue after submission on briefs with or with-
out oral argument, on a motion filed by a party, or on the court's own motion. It does
not include a voluntary dismissal or a settlement reached with or without the aid of a
court officer.
29. Aldisert, Appellate Justice, 11 J. L. REF. 317, 320 (1978) (80 cases); Wright,
The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Administration, 42 TEx. L. REV.
949, 956-58 (1964) (80 cases); C. JOINER, THE FUNCTION OF THE APPELLATE SYSTEM IN
JUSTICE IN THE STATES, 97, 112-13 (1971) (60 cases); JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 6,
at 142-46 (100 cases).
30. See, e.g., Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United
States 81, 106 (1971); Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the
United States 6, 168 (1977).
31. This estimate is based upon discussions of the author with members of various
state supreme courts over the past 10 years and not upon any published reports.
1979]
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opinions and on the opinions written by the other members of
the court. When the court is performing only the law develop-
ment function, the maximum number of opinions per judge is
still approximately twenty, with the balance of the judge's
time spent on deciding which cases to hear. At the intermedi-
ate appellate court level, the best experience would indicate
that one hundred cases per judge workload is a realistic maxi-
mum, even though there are many courts which dispose of
substantially more cases.2
B. Location of Courts: Unitary or Multiple Courts?
Traditions vary as to whether the appellate court sits only
in one location or at several locations throughout the jurisdic-
tion.33 This applies to supreme courts as well as to intermedi-
ate appellate courts. Clearly the efficiency of a court suffers
when its members and staff must travel to several sites to
hear cases. Given that the greatest problem of the appellate
system is the overwhelming caseload, it appears that the pub-
lic is best served by an appellate court which devotes the
maximum amount of time to deciding cases, and thus travel is
to be avoided. 4
The conflict between the needs of the court system and the
interests of individual litigants is clearly demonstrated by the
question of whether a jurisdiction should have a single inter-
mediate appellate court or a number of appellate courts lo-
cated throughout the jurisdiction. Here again the jurisdictions
offer a variety of responses.3 5 Favoring a single court sitting in
a single location are the demands of efficiency and the avoid-
ance of conflicts between separate courts sitting in different
districts. On the other hand, the interests of the individual
litigants are enhanced by having separate courts sitting at one
or more locations throughout the jurisdiction. Wisconsin, in
an effort to compromise these conflicting interests, established
a single intermediate appellate court but divided it into four
geographical districts with one panel elected in and sitting in
each district. Decisional uniformity is achieved by having any
32. VOLUME AND DELAY, supra note 23, at 7-22.
33. Id. at 55-66.
34. Swiggert, Bench and Bar Work Together in the Seventh Circuit, 61 A.B.A. J.
613 (1975).
35. JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 6, at 153-56; LEFLAR, supra note 24, at 68-69.
[Vol. 63:163
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published decision of one panel binding upon all others, but
with the decision on publication made by a panel composed of
the chief judge of the court and one judge from each of the
four districts.3 6 Efficiency and doctrinal uniformity will be
better served, however, with all of the judges sitting in a sin-
gle location.
IV. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
A majority of states and the federal system have found it
necessary to establish an intermediate appellate court be-
tween the trial courts and the supreme court.3" As noted
above in section III, there have been many different organiza-
tional frameworks for the intermediate appellate courts, with
no two exactly the same. There has been almost as much vari-
ety in the jurisdictional relationship between the intermediate
appellate and the supreme courts. 8 The usual pattern is an
intermediate appellate court with jurisdiction over some types
of appeals; other appeals are taken directly to the supreme
court. Sometimes included is a right of appeal from the inter-
mediate appellate court to the supreme court. With the pas-
sage of time, the increased number of appeals, and the grow-
ing importance of the law development function of the
supreme court, all appeals are heard initially by the interme-
diate appellate court. Review by the supreme court is increas-
ingly, if not exclusively, discretionary with the supreme court,
a development that has met with some opposition. Objections
include a belief that some cases, such as those involving con-
stitutional issues or lengthy criminal sentences, have sufficient
intrinsic importance to require consideration by the supreme
court. In addition, the burden of having a double appeal is
considered too great, and many contend that each litigant is
entitled to have his appeal heard by the highest court in the
jurisdiction. These objections have had to give way, however,
to the overwhelming pressure of the caseload and the logic of
having a court concerned principally with law development
36. Wis. STAT. § 752.41(3) (1977). The Wisconsin Supreme Court emphasized the
unity of the court of appeals in providing for its centralized administration. In re
Court of Appeals, 82 Wis. 2d 369, 263 N.W.2d 149 (1978).
37. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, STATE COURT SYSTEMS 2 (1978).
38. VOLUME AND DELAY, supra note 23, at 51-57.
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free from cases that do not involve such issues.
Wisconsin, the state which most recently has created an
intermediate appellate court, carried these ideas through to
their logical conclusion in establishing its court of appeals. Al-
though under the Wisconsin Constitution the legislature could
have imposed some mandatory jurisdiction upon the supreme
court,3 9 it decided to make all appeals of right to the court of
appeals, and any review of a court of appeals decision was
made discretionary in the supreme court.40 The decision of
the court of appeals is final, consequently, unless the supreme
court agrees to hear an appeal from that court. Enormous
flexibility is built into the system by virtue of another provi-
sion which allows but does not require the supreme court to
take jurisdiction over an appeal pending in the court of ap-
peals, either on the motion of a party, on the supreme court's
own motion or on certification by the court of appeals.41 This
permits the circumstances of the individual case, rather than
any arbitrary classification made in advance, to be the deter-
mining factor in which cases the supreme court will hear. This
procedure eliminates any possibility of an appeal being taken
to the wrong court - all appeals must go to the court of ap-
peals - but the court of appeals can be bypassed when ap-
propriate. This system appears to be the most logical and
practical approach of any state which has established an in-
termediate appellate court.
V. PRESERVING ISSUES FOR APPEAL
The appellate process begins long before the notice of ap-
peal is filed.42 Most appellate courts insist that an issue raised
on appeal must have first been presented in the trial court.43
It may not be enough, however, to raise a matter only once.
39. WIS. CONST., art. VII, § 3.
40. Wis. STAT. § 808.03(1) (1977).
41. Wis. STAT. § 808.05 (1977).
42. Horvitz, Protecting Your Record on Appeal, 4 LITIGATION, Winter, 1978, at 34.
43. Campbell, Extent to Which Courts of Review Will Consider Questions not
Properly Raised and Preserved - Part III, 8 Wis. L. REV. 147 (1933); Vestal, Sua
Sponte Consideration in Appellate Review, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 490-93 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Vestal]; Note, Raising New Issues on Appeal, 64 HARv. L. REV.
652 (1951); Annot., What Issues Will the Supreme Court Consider, Though Not, or
Not Properly, Raised By the Parties, 42 L. Ed. 2d 946 (1976).
[Vol. 63:163
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An exception to the original ruling"" or a post-trial motion45
may be required. In the appellate court the appellant is re-
quired to state the grounds for appeal in his brief,46 and there
may be additional formalities such as assignments of error,
bills of exception or inclusion of the relevant items from the
trial record in the appellate record, appendix or abstract of
record.
The requirement that an issue be presented first in the
trial court before it can be raised in the appellate court is as
old as appellate review, probably having its genesis in the
original writ of error which began as a new suit against the
trial judge alleging that he committed a wrongful act in ren-
dering a false judgment.47 Today there are, of course, substan-
tially different justifications for the same requirement. They
are (1) the trial court may not have committed the error if it
had been called to its attention;48 and (2) the review of the
appellate court is limited to correcting errors made by the
trial court.
The first justification incorporates several variations of the
same theme - it is unfair to the trial court to reverse on a
ground that it never had the opportunity to consider; a liti-
gant should not be able to build in error for a successful ap-
peal by failing to make timely objection; the requirement con-
serves the energies of both trial court and appellate court and
prevents reward to the unprepared attorney. The second justi-
fication, that of the appellate court being limited to reviewing
error, raises the same question as noted in section II above as
to the nature and function of appellate review and whether its
primary function is to do justice between the parties without
regard to procedural requirements.
There are exceptions to the rule that an issue must be
raised in the trial court before it can be raised in the appellate
44. M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 254-55 (2d ed. 1979).
45. P-M Gas & Wash Co. v. Smith, 375 N.E.2d 592 (Ind. 1978). In Indiana it was
for a time necessary to file not one, but two, successive post-trial motions in some
circumstances. Grove, The Requirement of a Second Motion to Correct Errors as a
Prerequisite to Appeal, 10 IND. L. REv. 462 (1977).
46. Vestal, supra note 43, at 494-95.
47. Sunderland, Improvement of Appellate Procedure, 26 IowA L. REv. 3, 7-8
(1940).
48. Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974).
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court. Questions of subject matter jurisdiction can of course
be raised at any time in any court either by a party or the
court.49 Other exceptions vary from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion.50 Most often utilized is the plain error - sometimes
called basic or fundamental error - doctrine. Under this ex-
ception an appellate court can review an error of the trial
court even though the appellant did not raise the issue in the
trial court.51 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a recent
case52 eliminated a long standing adherence to the plain error
rule. A number of reasons were given for the change, including
the potential of an increased number of appeals, the higher
educational standards imposed upon attorneys now as con-
trasted with when the rule was originally adopted, and the ad
hoc nature of the application of the rule.
A further question is whether the appellate court can on
its own motion consider an issue raised neither in the trial
court nor in the appellate court.53 The most dramatic example
is found in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins54 where the Supreme
Court reconsidered the question of whether federal courts in
diversity actions should apply federal common law rather
than state law. The question was never raised in the trial
court, the briefs or at oral argument in the Supreme Court.
The solution to the question lies in recognizing that while
appellate courts exist for the ultimate purpose of doing jus-
tice, justice is best served by requiring the parties to comply
with the various procedural requirements established by stat-
utes and rules. Without adherence to these rules, by judges as
well as litigants, only chaos will result. The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has discussed
this principle:
[R]ules of procedure such as the one here pertinent are
not mere naked technicalities. As we recently had occasion
49. See note 113 infra.
50. See note 43 supra.
51. Vestal, supra note 43, at 503-06; Annot., What Issues Will the Supreme
Court Consider, Though Not, or Not Properly, Raised By the Parties, 42 L. Ed. 2d
946, 971 (1976).
52. Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114 (1974).
53. Tate, Sua Sponte Consideration on Appeal, 9 ThiAL JUDGES J. 68 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Tate]; Vestal, supra note 43.
54. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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to observe, reasonable adherence to clear, reasonable and
known rules of procedure is essential to the administration
of justice. Justice cannot be administered in chaos. More-
over, the administration of justice involves not only meticu-
lous disposition of the conflicts in one particular case but
the expeditious disposition of hundreds of cases. If the
courts must stop to inquire where substantial justice on the
merits lies every time a litigant refuses or fails to abide by
the reasonable and known rules of procedure, there will be
no administration of justice. Litigants must be required to
cooperate in the efficient disposition of their cases.
We are told that in substance no injustice would result
from ignoring the rules in this case. That may be, but it can-
not justify the departure. Just as soon as rules of procedure
are ignored in order to do substantial justice on the merits
in a particular case, there are no rules. What is done in one
case must be done in all.55
It is particularly difficult to ascertain whether raising an
issue after trial proceedings are concluded will cause more or
less justice. In most cases it will be impossible for the appel-
late court to know what would have occurred at the trial had
an issue been raised or an objection made at the appropriate
time. Different trial tactics may have been used, different evi-
dence introduced or even settlements made. Absent a showing
of fraud, mistake or other irregularity which would authorize
the trial court to reconsider a judgment, the winning party
should be entitled to defend the judgment on the basis of the
record and not be faced with a hypothetical situation.
The dangers of injustice are heightened by appellate court
decisions on issues not raised by the parties. Such a procedure
cannot further justice, since the parties are denied basic due
process rights of notice and opportunity to be heard on the
issue on which the case will be decided.
This rigid rule should not, however, be applied to law de-
velopment issues, because this may prevent reconsideration of
a legal question that was considered foreclosed by prior deci-
sions. An appellate court contemplating such reconsideration
should notify the parties and request their views on the issue,
55. United States v. Seigel, 168 F.2d 143, 146 (1948). Judge Charles E. Clark, who
was the principal draftsman of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, takes an oppos-
ing view in Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 297 (1938).
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either in the original briefs or in supplemental briefs. This
will permit the appellate court to perform its law development
function and at the same time preserve the right to be
heard."6
While the parties should be held strictly to the mandate
that they must first present an issue to the trial court, there is
no need for the additional burden of insisting that they make
an exception to an adverse ruling or file a motion for a new
trial. The exception requirement has been abolished under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure57 and in most other jurisdic-
tions. It has little merit and its historical justification is found
in the long abandoned bill of exceptions." The mandatory
new trial motion has more currency, however, and is still nec-
essary in some states.59 While the new trial motion serves a
useful function and is often appropriate, there appears to be
little justification for making it a prerequisite to an appeal.
The arguments in support of presenting an issue at least once
to the trial court 0 have no applicability to presenting it for a
second time, nor do there appear to be any independent rea-
sons for doing so except to permit the trial judge to look at a
question decided during the heat of trial in a cooler, more re-
laxed atmosphere. There is no evidence that suggests that the
requirement reduces the number of appeals, so it cannot be
justified on an efficiency basis. Whether a post-trial motion
should be filed should, consequently, be at the discretion of
counsel and not mandatory.
The extent to which issues intended to be raised on appeal
must be included in the record, appendix, abstract of record
or appellate brief, is discussed below in the sections dealing
with the record, briefs and appendices.
VI. APPEALABILITY
No area of appellate practice and procedure has produced
56. Contra, Tate, supra note 53.
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 46.
58. M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 254-55 (2d ed. 1979).
59. For example, Indiana. See note 45 supra. Wisconsin had the requirement until
1978. Wells v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 274 Wis. 505, 80 N.W.2d 380 (1957). Its new
appellate rules were intended to eliminate it. R. MARTINEAU & R. MALMGREN, WIS-
CONSIN APPELLATE PRACTICE 44 (1978).
60. See text accompanying notes 41-53 supra.
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such extensive commentary and so many conflicting decisions
as that of finality and appealability. This perennial problem
has been noted over the years. In 1892, the United States Su-
preme Court commented that "probably no question of equity
practice has been the subject of more frequent discussion in
this court than the finality of decrees. ' 'el In 1974 the Court
stated "no verbal formula yet devised can explain prior final-
ity decisions with unerring accuracy or provide an utterly reli-
able guide for the future. ' 62 The same situation has been true
in the states.6 3
As a general rule an appeal can be taken only from a final
judgment." The historical, conceptual and practical bases for
this rule have been developed elsewhere and need not be re-
peated here. The necessities of doing justice between the
parties and of judicial administration have been thought to
require some exceptions to the general rule. These occur in
such areas as practical finality, multiple parties or claims, col-
lateral orders, stays and injunctive orders, and certain clearly
interlocutory orders,6 and have been created by statute, rule
or judicial decision.
Proposed resolutions of this problem include: (1) Making
every appeal discretionary with the appellate court and noth-
ing appealable as of right;67 (2) Applying a balancing test to
determine appealability;6 8 (3) Liberalizing the use of the ex-
traordinary writs to review nonfinal judgments; 9 and (4) Lim-
iting appeals as of right to final judgments but permitting cer-
61. McGourkey v. Toledo & 0. Cent. Ry., 146 U.S. 536, 544 (1892).
62. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974).
63. "The finality of judgments for appealibility has been a recurring and nagging
problem throughout the judicial history of this State." North East Independent
School Dist. v. Aldridge, 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1966).
64. Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539 (1932)
[hereinafter cited as Crick]. The term final judgment is generally used to include final
orders and will be so used in this section.
65. Crick, supra note 64; Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealibility in
the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 89 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Redish]; Note,
Appealibility in the Federal Courts, 75 HARv. L. REV. 351 (1961).
66. Crick, supra note 64; Redish, supra note 65; Note, Appealability in the Fed-
eral Courts, 75 HARv. L. REV. 351 (1961).
67. Crick, supra note 64, at 563-65.
68. Redish, supra note 65, at 97-101.
69. Note, The Writ of Mandamus: A Possible Answer to the Final Judgment
Rule, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 1102 (1950).
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tain appeals from nonfinal judgments.70
The third of these solutions represents a misapplication of
one form of the limited original jurisdiction accorded most ap-
pellate courts by constitution or statute - the supervisory
power.71 Usually providing for prerogative writs such as man-
damus or prohibition, the supervisory power permits review of
an action by a trial court not otherwise appealable. The use of
these writs was originally carefully circumscribed and should
still be limited to such situations as inaction by the trial court
or when the respondent is an officer, such as a sheriff, who is
carrying out an order of a trial court.
Unfortunately, appellate courts began using the supervi-
sory power as a means of allowing an interlocutory appeal
when statutes restricting appeals to final judgments did not
permit immediate review of a nonfinal action of the trial
court. This development was particularly evident in the fed-
eral courts, but was not limited to them. 2 Such perversion of
the supervisory jurisdiction can be eliminated if the proposal
is adopted to limit appeals as of right to final judgments, but
to allow a discretionary appeal from any nonfinal action.
The first step is to recognize the distinction between ap-
peal as of right and appeal in the discretion of the court.
Many discussions of appealability do not recognize the crucial
difference between the two or that arguments for and against
the final judgment rule are not applicable to discretionary ap-
peals. Even the most common statement of the final judgment
70. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 14, at § 3.12. A similar proposal is contained in a
bill now pending in Congress. Kennedy, The Federal Courts Improvement Act: A
First Step for Congress to Take, 63 JUD. 8, 12 (1979). An earlier effort along the same
lines met with no success. Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts Under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 88 HARV. L. REv. 607, 610 (1975).
71. Note, Supervisory and Advisory Mandamus Under the All Writs Act, 86
HARV. L. REV. 595 (1973). The second form of original jurisdiction is more truly origi-
nal in that it will involve a dispute between private parties or an individual and a
government agency or officer which would ordinarily be filed in a trial court. This
type of jurisdiction is limited to the supreme court. The sole basis for asking the
supreme court to take original jurisdiction is that the case involves issues of such
general importance to the state or the people that an immediate taking of jurisdiction
by the supreme court is appropriate. See, e.g., Petition of Heil, 230 Wis. 428, 284
N.W. 42 (1934).
72. Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV.
751, 771-78 (1957); Note, The Writ of Mandamus: A Possible Answer to the Final
Judgment Rule, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 1102 (1950).
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rule does not indicate whether it applies to all appeals or only
appeals as of right.73 This is due in part to the fact that his-
torically all appeals were of right7 4 and most statutes dealing
with appeals do not make the distinction.7 5 Nonetheless, it is
the distinction between the two which offers the best basis for
solution to this problem.
Limiting appeals as of right to final judgments has the
principal purpose of protecting both the courts and litigants
from the costs of multiple appeals.76 When a litigant can ap-
peal as of right a nonfinal judgment, control over the pace of
the litigation and the decision as to the expense and delay of
an appeal is placed on the litigant and not the courts. The
courts must hear the appeal, even though it may have no
merit. The opposing party must participate in the appeal in
order to protect his interests. Such an appeal can be taken
without regard to whether the issue would be reviewable on
appeal of the final judgment or the need to resolve the matter
prior to an appeal of the final judgment. An alternative solu-
tion is propounded by the American Bar Association's Stan-
dards of Judicial Administration for Appellate Courts. It is
suggested that there be a right of appeal only from final judg-
ments, and that all nonfinal judgments be reviewable only in
the discretion of the appellate court and only if they meet a
general standard for reviewability. 77 This proposal appears to
satisfy the objectives of the final judgment rule, while at the
same time provides sufficient flexibility to avoid the complica-
73. Crick, supra note 64.
74. E.g., Act of September 24, 1789, ch. XX § 21, 1 Stat. 73 at 83.
75. KRAMER, supra note 27, at Question D-1.
76. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 14, at § 3.12 (Commentary).
77. Id. at 3.12.
Appealable Judgments and Orders
(a) Final Judgment. Appellate review ordinarily should be available only
upon the rendition of final judgment in the court from which appeal or appli-
cation for review is taken.
(b) Interlocutory Review. Orders other than final judgments ordinarily
should be subject to immediate appellate review only at the discretion of the
reviewing court where it determines that resolution of the questions of law on
which the order is based will:
(1) Materially advance the termination of the litigation or clarify fur-
ther proceedings therein;
(2) Protect a party from substantial and irreparable injury; or
(3) Clarify an issue of general importance in the administration of
justice.
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tions which have developed under that rule.
The ABA proposal incorporates the concept that there
should be the right to at least one appeal. Although the right
to appeal has not yet been incorporated into due process stan-
dards under the fifth and fourteenth amendments,7 8 the right
to at least one appeal is recognized by constitution or statute
in every American jurisdiction except Virginia and West Vir-
ginia.79 Thus, there seems little point to argue for a restricted
right to appeal from final judgements. It would be almost as
fruitless to argue for strict adherence to the final judgment
rule. Experience has shown that neither legislative bodies nor
courts are willing to adhere to the rule if it means that in
some cases there will be no effective review of a nonfinal judg-
ment which for some reason should be reviewed. Experience
has also demonstrated that any legislative effort to provide for
appeal of some nonfinal judgments will fail because the legis-
lature cannot forsee all of the circumstances in which an ap-
peal of a nonfinal judgment is necessary or desirable.
The general standards contained in the ABA proposal can-
not prevent an appellate court from hearing any nonfinal ap-
peal. The proposal recognizes that courts do create legally jus-
tifiable bases for hearing nonfinal appeals, and any effort to
prohibit them from doing so is doomed to failure. The better
strategy is to give courts the authority to hear any nonfinal
appeal, but to state in general terms those types of issues
which the court should hear.
The ABA proposal places the responsibility for determin-
ing which nonfinal orders may be appealed solely in the appel-
late court and not in the trial court. This is somewhat differ-
ent from 28 U.S.C. section 1292(b), which permits
interlocutory appeals when both the trial and appellate courts
rule in their discretion that the appeal is appropriate under
the statutory tests.80 Also different is Federal Rule of Civil
78. See note 10 supra.
79. Lilly & Scalia, Appellate Justice: A Crisis in Virginia? 57 VA. L. REv. 3, 12-13
(1971).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970):
(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for differ-
ence of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially
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Procedure 54(b), which permits piecemeal appeals following
partial "final" judgments,"1 and which creates an immediate
right of appeal as to those matters. The justification for trial
court involvement in this process is that the trial court knows
the most about the case and the issues involved in it and can
best determine whether immediate appeal is either necessary
or desirable for the further processing of the case in the trial
court.
8 2
However, policies behind the ABA proposal placing the de-
cision solely in the appellate court are most persuasive. First,
the parties can and should inform the appellate court of the
impact of the appeal upon their interests and the relationship
between an immediate appeal and trial court proceedings.
The appellate court can take this into consideration. Second,
and more important, is the impact of an immediate appeal
upon the appellate court and the other cases pending in it. 38
The trial court should not have control over the caseload of
the appellate court. Moreover, to the extent the trial court has
a role in determining appealability, additional delay is built
into the process. The ABA proposal has been adopted almost
verbatim by Wisconsin as part of its revision of its appellate
process in 1978.' Wisconsin had, prior to that revision, ex-
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing
in such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit
an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten
days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, That application for an
appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the
district judge or the Court of Appeal or a judge thereof shall so order.
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b):
(b) Judgment upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties. When
more than one claim for relief is presented in an action .... or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direc-
tion for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direc-
tion, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudi-
cates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the
order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of
all the parties.
82. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437 (1956).
83. Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b), 88 HARv. L. REv. 607, 635 (1975).
84. Wis. STAT. § 808.03 (1977).
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tremely complicated statutes on appeals of final and nonfinal
judgments 5 plus an enormous body of case law interpreting
and applying those provisions. The result was increased diffi-
culty in determining what was appealable until after the su-
preme court decided the particular case. The legislature chose
to make a clean break with the past and start anew with the
ABA proposal. It is too early to determine whether the effort
has been successful, but it offers the best hope for the solution
to a problem that for over one hundred years defied
solution."8
VII. PARTIES
Questions often arise concerning who can appeal, which
parties have a right to participate in the appeal, who must be
served with appeal papers and whether parties should be des-
ignated as appellants or appellees.
It is usually stated that only a party aggrieved by a deci-
sion 7 can appeal from it."8 As with most general statements of
rules, it is simple in expression but more difficult in imple-
mentation, particularly in some of its corollaries. The ag-
grieved party rule is often based upon statute, but the rule
also exists independently of statute.8 9 The rule is, in actuality,
nothing more than the concept of standing as applied to the
appellate process. In the same way that a person whose inter-
ests are not adversely affected by an action lacks standing to
challenge that action in court, a person whose interests are
not adversely affected by a judgment lacks standing to contest
the judgment in an appellate court.
This rule is applied without much difficulty to the parties
to the trial court action, but problems arise when a nonparty
seeks to appeal a judgment claiming he is affected adversely
85. Wis. STAT. ch. 817 (1975).
86. The decision of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in Northridge Bank v. Com-
munity Eye Care Center, Inc., 91 Wis. 2d 298, 282 N.W.2d 632 (Ct. App. 1979), re-
view granted per curiam, 94 Wis. 2d 201, 287 N.W.2d 810 (1980) (noted in 52 Wis.
BAR BULL. 56 (1979)), suggests the difficulties in resolving the finality question.
87. A decision is the disposition or the judgment of a court, not its opinion. Neely
v. State, 89 Wis. 2d 755, 279 N.W.2d 255 (1979).
88. In re Fidelity Assurance Ass'n, 247 Wis. 619, 624, 20 N.W.2d 638, 641 (1945);
Note, Administrative Law - Right of Persons Aggrieved by Orders to Review by
Appellate Courts, 42 MIcH. L. REv. 157 (1943).
89. In re Fidelity Assurance Ass'n, 247 Wis. at 624, 20 N.W.2d at 641.
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by it. For example, cases involving estates or funds justifiably
allow claimants to participate in the trial court without be-
coming a formal party to the proceeding9 0 Nonetheless, there
is no justification for permitting a person to initiate an appeal
or participate in the appellate court without first becoming a
formal party. The status of such a person is always in doubt,
causing confusion in the effectiveness of the notice of appeal,
titling of the appeal, service of papers and notices, and ulti-
mately the binding effect of the judgment upon the person.
The appellate rules should provide, consequently, that a per-
son who desires to participate in an appeal must become a
formal party by filing a motion to intervene. The rules will
also have to establish some standards for intervention; these
can be taken from the intervention rule applicable to the trial
courts.91 The motion should be filed in the court in which the
record is located and acted upon by the court which has pos-
session of the records.2
There can be confusion in the appellate court as to
whether a party is an appellant or appellee. Those who attack
the judgment of the lower court should be appellants, and
those who support it should be appellees. To ensure clarity, a
party who wants to join with the appellant in challenging the
judgment should be required to fie a notice of appeal. Thus if
there is a joint notice of appeal both parties would be known
as appellants, while if there is a separate notice of appeal the
second appellant should be designated as co-appellant. If a
party does not fie a notice of appeal, he should not be able to
participate in the appeal except as an appellee in support of
the judgment. Thus an appellee must fie a cross-appeal to be
able to challenge an action of the trial court.93
90. United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977); West v. Radio-Keith-
Orpheum Corp., 70 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1934); Pearman v. Schlook, 575 S.W.2d 462 (Ky.
1978); Annot., 118 A.L.R. 743 (1939).
91. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
92. Thus if the motion is filed when the record is in the trial court and the record
is forwarded to the appellate court before the trial court acts on the motion, the
appellate court rather than the trial court should decide whether to grant the motion.
This is done not because of any notion that the trial court loses jurisdiction over the
case, but because it avoids the confusion that may result from one court acting on
matters involving the status of parties in a case pending in another court.
93. Littlefield v. Littlefield, 292 A.2d 204 (Me. 1972), noted in 25 ME. L. REv. 105
(1973); Stern, When to Cross-Appeal or Cross-Petition - Certainty or Confusion? 87
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VIII. INITIATION AND PERFECTION OF THE APPEAL
The procedure for the initiation of an appeal has been sim-
plified and refined to the extent that in many jurisdictions all
that is required is to file a notice of appeal in the trial court in
order to confer jurisdiction over the appeal on the appellate
court. 9 4 There are, however, a number of areas which still cre-
ate problems for both litigants and the courts.
The first difficulty encountered is with the time require-
ment for filing the notice of appeal. Most jurisdictions have
adopted a thirty-day time requirement.95 This is a marked re-
duction from previous appeal time periods that often ex-
tended up to one year. Such long periods for initiating an ap-
peal are undesirable from the standpoint of the litigants as
well as that of the judicial system." The thirty-day period ap-
pears to work well in practice and is not burdensome upon
litigants.97 Exceptions to the thirty-day limit appear to be un-
justified, and destroy the uniformity and certainty which
should accompany procedural requirements. In most jurisdic-
tions there are special appeal periods for special types of
cases.98 These may be longer or shorter than the general ap-
peal period, reflecting an intent either to speed up the appel-
late process or to give additional time to litigants. Deviations
are enacted by the legislature, not by the courts, and it is usu-
ally impossible to find any stated reason for the deviation.
Whatever the rationales for special appeal time periods in
certain types of cases, the necessity for uniformity should be
given paramount consideration. The principal reason for this
is the significance that the filing of a timely notice of appeal
HARv. L. REV. 763 (1974).
94. E.g., FED. R. APP. P. 3(a). "Failure of an appellant to take any step other than
the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is
ground only for such action as the court of appeals deems appropriate, which may
include dismissal of the appeal."
95. KRAMER, supra note 27, at Question F-1.
96. R. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 340-42 (1940); UNITED STATES
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 2-4, 94-95
(1946).
97. Evidence in support of this statement can only be negative, that is, the lack of
any published support of enlargement of the time period.
98. E.g., Wis. STAT. § 808.04(2) (1977) lists 28 statutory exceptions to the general
time period. The Wisconsin Judicial Council Committee on Appellate Practice and
Procedure when it drafted chapter 808 expressly decided not to change any of the
special time periods established by other statutory provisions.
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has in the appellate process. It is generally agreed that an ap-
pellate court obtains jurisdiction over an appeal only if a no-
tice of appeal is timely filed." It is also the general, but not
universal, rule that an appellate court has no authority to
waive or extend the time period absent a specific grant of au-
thority by statute.100 The rigid enforcement of this rule raises
the same considerations as any enforcement of a procedural
rule which prevents the court from reaching the merits of a
case and doing justice between the parties. As discussed in
section II, this approach to procedural rules is self-defeating,
and substantial justice is usually not ascertainable by an ap-
pellate court. The timely filing requirement rule should, con-
sequently, be enforced without exception or reluctance. Such
being the case, the desirability of having only one appeal time
period becomes even more pronounced.10 1 The simpler and
more uniform the procedural requirements connected with an
appeal, the easier it is to comply, and the easier it is to insist
upon compliance.
Particularly unfortunate is an exception to the normal
thirty-day period found in rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Ap-
pellate Procedure. Section (a)(1) of that rule provides that in
a civil case in which the United States or an officer or agency
thereof is a party, a party has sixty days in which to appeal.
The only justification for granting this longer appeal time is
the inability of the federal bureaucracy to make decisions
within thirty days. This argument is unpersuasive. In criminal
cases the federal government has only thirty days in which to
appeal. 10 2 There may be other special classes of litigants de-
serving of longer periods of time in which to take an appeal.
They are not recognized, however, because the need for uni-
formity is thought to be the higher objective. The same should
apply to the federal government.
Another provision found almost solely in the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure is for an extension by the district
court of up to thirty days upon a showing of excusable neg-
99. Comment, Ad Hoc Relief for Untimely Appeals, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 97 (1965).
100. Id. at 104-05; contra, Costanzi v. Ryan, 368 N.E.2d 12, 16 (Ind. App. 1977).
101. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals in Nelson v. Department of Natural Re-
sources, 90 Wis. 2d 574, 280 N.W.2d 334 (1979), called for the elimination of the
separate appeal time periods in Wisconsin.
102. FED. R. App. P. 4(b).
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lect.10 3 The request may be made or granted before or after
the initial appeal time period has expired. This means that
until the sixty-day period has expired, execution or enforce-
ment of the judgment or order entered is very likely to be
delayed.
Whatever appeal time period is chosen, it appears most
undesirable to build into the sytem a means for extending
that time. The uncertainties and possible unequal treatment
between litigants far outweigh the benefits of allowing an oc-
casional litigant to file a late appeal. If thirty days is sufficient
time for most litigants to decide whether to appeal, then that
limit should govern all litigants.
Defects in the notice of appeal such as failing to name the
court to which the appeal is taken' 04 or incorrectly identifying
the court to which the appeal is taken'0 5 or the judgment ap-
pealed from are usually held not to affect the validity of the
appeal. The courts and the parties must, however, have some
basis to ascertain what is being appealed and to which court.
The federal courts have even held that filing of the notice of
appeal in the court of appeals rather than in the district court
is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the appellate court.10
The theory adopted was that the sole requirement of inform-
ing the courts and the parties that the appeal was being taken
was satisfied. This rationale is consistent with the view that
all courts should be viewed as part of a single court of justice
and that courts should decide cases on the merits rather than
on procedural technicalities.10 7 Courts at different levels are
not, however, merely branches of a single court absent a con-
stitutional statement to that effect, 08 and the necessity for
filing is not treated so lightly in other court proceedings. This
application of the filing requirement converts it into nothing
more than an actual notice requirement, which can cause ma-
103. FED. R. APP. P. (4)(a)(5). Excusable neglect is defined in Winchell v. Lort-
scher, 377 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1967).
104. Cutting v. Bullerdick, 178 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1949).
105. Graves v. General Ins. Corp., 381 F.2d 517 (10th Cir. 1967).
106. Richey v. Wilkins, 335 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1964). FED. R. APP. P. 4(2)(1) as
amended in 1979 now expressly so provides.
107. 5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 407-16 (1959); Pound, The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906).
108. KY. CONST. § 109 creates a Court of Justice composed of the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals and trial courts.
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jor problems. Filing is, after all, not solely for the benefit of
the courts and the parties. Filing of certain legal papers is re-
quired because persons affected by, but not connected with,
the litigation are entitled to rely on the public records of the
court.
Service of the notice of appeal on other parties is usually
required, but the significance of the service varies among ju-
risdictions. One view is that service of the notice of appeal has
the same significance as its filing, i.e., service on all parties is
necessary to confer jurisdiction over the appeal on the appel-
late court and the failure to serve a party requires dismissal of
the appeal as to all parties.10 Under another view, failure of
service affects only jurisdiction of the appellate court over the
party not served, but does not affect the validity of the appeal
as to other parties.110 A third approach treats service as not
affecting jurisdiction over the appeal or jurisdiction over a
party, but simply as a notice requirement, noncompliance
with which may result in the imposition of one of a range of
penalties including dismissal of the appeal as to the party not
served. This is the rule in the federal courts even though it is
the duty of the clerk of the district court, and not the appel-
lant, to serve the notice."'
The first two approaches appear to treat the filing of the
notice of appeal as the initiation of a new lawsuit, and thus
service of the notice of appeal is considered as significant as
service of the complaint in the trial court. There is an histori-
cal basis for this view because the writ of error was originally
a lawsuit against the judge, and thus it had to be initiated in a
manner similar to other lawsuits." 2 An appeal is not, of
course, the initiation of a new lawsuit, but the transfer of ju-
risdiction over a case from a lower court to higher court.
When jurisdiction over the case is tranferred from the trial
court to the appellate court, jurisdiction over the parties nec-
109. National Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Hand, 188 Kan. 521, 363 P.2d 447 (1961).
This used to be the law in Wisconsin. Falk v. Industrial Comm'n, 258 Wis. 109, 45
N.W.2d 161 (1950).
110. Wisconsin also followed this rule for a period of time. Walford v. Bartsch, 65
Wis. 2d 254, 222 N.W.2d 633 (1974).
111. Caspar v. Devine, 257 F.2d 197 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
112. Sunderland, Improvement of Appellate Procedure, 26 IowA L. REv. 3, 7
(1940).
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essarily follows. It should not be necessary for the appellate
court to establish jurisdiction anew. If a copy of the notice of
appeal is not served on a party in the trial court, then that
party is entitled to file a motion to be dismissed from the ap-
peal, not because the appellate court does not have jurisdic-
tion over him, but because he is prejudiced by not receiving
notice of the appeal.1 '
Problems also arise over who should be served with the no-
tice of appeal. In some jurisdictions the appellant serves only
those parties in the trial court he thinks will be adverse to
him.114 It is not always possible, of course, to know who will
be adverse to whom and who may want to join in an appeal.
The only safe course is to require service on all parties in the
trial court,"5 and allow each party to ascertain how to
proceed.
Perfection of the appeal, as distinguished from its initia-
tion, involves a variety of steps including payment of the ap-
pellate court's filing fee, posting of the appeal bond, ordering
the transcript and docketing in the appellate court. Failure.to
take any one of these steps does not usually render the appeal
defective, although it may be grounds for dismissal if the act
is not performed within a reasonable time."" Nonetheless, the
appellate rules should make perfecting the appeal as simple as
possible, and not impose upon the parties responsibilities
which properly belong to court officials.
The first requirement should be that the filing fee for the
appeal accompany the notice of appeal. As soon as the notice
and filing fee are received by the trial court clerk, they should
be forwarded, along with the docket entries, to the appellate
113. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has adopted a curious definition of subject
matter jurisdiction. It treats subject matter jurisdiction not as the class of matters
over which it has appellate jurisdiction, but as jurisdiction over the particular appeal-
able judgment. State v. Van Duyse, 66 Wis. 2d 286, 224 N.W.2d 603 (1975). According
to that opinion, the supreme court obtains subject matter jurisdiction over an appeal-
able judgment when the judgment is entered in the trial court. It then must obtain
personal jurisdiction over the appellee through timely service of the notice of appeal.
When that occurs, it can hear the appeal. This approach is not only inconsistent with
the traditional view of subject matter jurisdiction, it also ignores the definition of
subject matter jurisdiction in Wis. STAT. § 801.04(1) (1977).
114. National Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Hand, 188 Kan. 521, 363 P. 2d 447 (1961).
115. FED. R. App. P. 3(d).
116. FED. R. App. P. 3(a); Karlen, Civil Appeals: English and American Ap-
proaches Compared, 21 WM. & MARY L. REv. 121, 131-41 (1979).
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court for immediate docketing. At this point full control over
the appeal is vested in the appellate court. In most jurisdic-
tions the appellate court is not apprised of the appeal until
the record is filed with the appellate court. This may not oc-
cur until months after the notice of appeal was filed, thereby
causing a substantial delay in processing. This delay often re-
sults because, between the time of filing of the notice of ap-
peal and docketing in the appellate court, neither the trial
court nor the appellate court feels responsible for processing
the appeal, and thus things are not done which should be
done.117
IX. RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT
The preparation of the record and transcript and their
filing in the appellate court have been two major roadblocks
in attempting to expedite the appellate process." 8 Part of the
reason has been referred to above - the lack of control by
either the trial court or the appellate court over their prepara-
tion. Even the placement of this control in the appellate court
is not enough, however, to guarantee that the record and tran-
script will be quickly and timely fied.
The appellate rules must first define what is to be included
in the record. This can be either a short general statement as
in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure'" or a more com-
prehensive listing as in Wisconsin. 20 The short description is
better from the standpoint of brevity, while the listing of the
specific items has the advantage of being more complete and
avoiding mistakes. The former can be used in a jurisdiction
with experienced and capable trial court clerks, but the latter
may be necessary where trial court clerks are elected and
there are often wholesale changeovers in a clerk's office
personnel.
A major defect in many appellate rules is that they place
117. LEFLAR, supra note 24, at 13.
118: Id. at 19; NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, MANAGEMENT OF COURT RE-
PORTING SERVICES 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS];
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 14, at § 3.13(d) (Commentary); Erickson, The Trial
Transcript - An Unnecessary Roadblock to Expeditious Appellate Review, 11 J.L.
REF. 344 (1978).
119. FED. R. APP. P. 10(a).
120. Wis. STAT. § 809.15(1)(a) (1977).
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the responsibility for the preparation of the record and the
transcript upon the appellant although the record is in the
custody of the trial court clerk, and the transcript in the notes
of the court reporter.'21 It makes far more sense to place, as
do the federal and Wisconsin rules, the responsibility for or-
dering the record and the transcript on the appellant, and
then place on the clerk and the reporter the duty to file them
with the appellate court.122
No special notice should be necessary to order the record;
the notice of appeal serves that function. The clerk should
then be charged with assembling the record, numbering the
pages and notifying the attorneys when it is ready for trans-
mittal to the appellate court. The attorneys should have a
brief opportunity to review the record to make sure it con-
tains everything necessary. The attorneys will not usually
have to visit the courthouse to examine the record if the clerk
is required to send to the attorneys a list of all the items to be
included. This list merely duplicates the table of contents of
the record the clerk sends to the appellate court. If for any
reason the record is not timely filed in the appellate court,
then the appellate court clerk can deal directly with the trial
court clerk and not with the appellant, who can do nothing
more than contact the trial court clerk.
Whatever the problems with having the record filed in the
appellate court, they pale in significance in comparison to the
difficulties in ordering, preparing and filing the transcript. It
has been stated that "slow preparation of trial transcripts has
been a major cause of delayed appellate decisions.' 28 The
reasons for this are many: (1) Failure of the attorney to order
immediately the transcript or to make satisfactory arrange-
ments for payment; (2) Failure of the attorney to order only
essential parts of the transcript; (3) Heavy demands upon the
court reporter to record additional court proceedings; (4) Lack
of supervision of the preparation of the transcript by the ap-
pellate court or the trial court; (5) The willingness of the trial
court to grant the reporter extensions of time for preparing
121. KRAMER, supra note 27, at Question F-7.
122. FED. R. APP. P. 11; Wis. STAT. §§ 809.15-.16 (1977).
123. LEFLAR, supra note 24, at 19; see also VOLUME AND DELAY, supra note 23, at
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the transcript; (6) Failure on the part of reporters to use mod-
ern equipment or support personnel to aid them; (7) The ex-
clusive assignment of one court reporter to one judge; (8) The
fee system for paying for transcripts; (9) The independent
contractor status of reporters; and (10) Poorly trained and un-
qualified reporters.124 Some jurisdictions have solved these
problems, but many have not. There have been a substantial
number of experiments with using tape recordings as a substi-
tute for a court reporter, and even the use of a computer to
produce a transcript from a recording. 125
Eventually technology may permit the replacement of
court reporters, but this is not likely to happen for some time
and the existing problems must be dealt with to the extent
possible. Experience has shown that most, if not all, of the
delays in preparation of the transcript can be eliminated if
attorneys are compelled to order the transcript shortly after
the notice of appeal is filed, extensions of time come only
from the appellate court, and court reporters are the only per-
sons to request the extension. Most importantly, the appellate
court must monitor the preparation of the transcript so that
any potential problems can be anticipated and avoided.12 To
keep the appellate court advised of the status of the tran-
script, the appellant should be required to file with the appel-
late court, within ten days of the filing of the notice of appeal
with the trial court, a statement signed by the court reporter
that all or designated portions of the transcript have been or-
dered, satisfactory arrangements have been made for payment
and a date given for completion of the transcript. 2 ' This
statement notifies the appellate court that the attorney has
done his job and that the court reporter knows what his obli-
gations are and when they must be completed. The appellate
court is, consequently, in the position of knowing the status of
the preparation of the transcript and who is responsible if it is
not filed within the required time.
The placement of the responsibility for granting extensions
for preparation of the transcript in the appellate court rather
124. LEFLAR, supra note 24, at 19; NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE CouRTs, supra
note 118, at 2.
125. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 118, at 29-33.
126. Id. at 35-38.
127. Wis. STAT. § 809.16(1).
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than the trial court is a return to the practice that had once
been common. Assignment of the extension granting authority
to the trial court, the current system, was thought preferable
because it would be more efficient to have it done locally,
would save the time of the appellate court and the trail court
would be in a better position to know the competing demands
upon the court reporter. The system does not work because
the trial court will always grant the extension either because
of the close working relationship between the judge and the
court reporter or because the judge does not want the work on
the transcript to interfere with the reporter's courtroom re-
sponsibilities. The result is that preparation of the transcript,
without which the appeal cannot proceed, is hindered for rea-
sons unrelated to the appellate court or the particular case.
The appellate court under this system is unable to control the
flow of appeals taken to it and thus is unable to control its
own workload.
The relationship between appellate court control over ap-
peals taken to it and the efficiency of the court has only re-
cently been recognized but is now accepted without any seri-
ous dispute. 128 Control over the transcript is particularly
important because of the central role it plays in appellate re-
view and because its preparation is dependant upon a person
who is the employee of the trial court. The working relation-
ship between the trial court and the reporter has obscured the
fact that the principal purpose for having a court reporter re-
cord the proceedings is to have a transcript available in the
event of an appeal. When the trial court has control over the
preparation of the transcript, however, the recording of daily
courtroom testimony is given precedence over transcript'prep-
aration. Ideally, the court reporters should be in the employ
of the appellate court rather than the trial court, but it is suf-
ficient to have the appellate court control the preparation of
the transcript.
The appellate court probably has adequate power, either
inherent or statutory, to take the steps necessary to force a
128. VOLUME AND DELAY, supra note 23, at 84; ABA TASK FORCE ON APPELLATE
PROCEDURE, EFFICIENCY AND JUSTICE IN APPEALS: METHODS AND SELECTED MATERIALS
12-15 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ABA TASK FORCE]; BURGER, The State of the Fed-
eral Judiciary, 57 A.B.A. J. 855, 858 (1971).
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reporter to produce a transcript in a timely manner. It would
be useful, however, to have the appellate rules specifically
provide for the steps that can be taken by the appellate court.
These steps should include withholding the reporter's
paycheck, prohibiting him from doing any outside work such
as depositions, prohibiting him from serving as an official
court reporter, contempt and, if necessary, discharge. These
may be drastic steps, but courts have recognized their author-
ity to take them.12 It would be preferable, however, to state
them expressly in the rules so that the reporters are on notice
as to the potential penalties for failure to produce the tran-
script in a timely manner.
X. BRIEFS AND APPENDICES
In the American appellate process the role and relative im-
portance of the written brief and oral argument have been re-
versed from that in England. In the latter the brief was just
that - a written summary of a lengthy oral argument. In the
former, oral argument, to the extent there is any, is an oral
summary of the principal points of the brief.130 Whatever are
the relative merits of the two different methods, courts in this
country for many years to come will rely principally upon the
written brief as the means of communication from the parties
to the court. It is essential, consequently, that the briefs be
structured in such a way as to make it as easy as possible for
the parties to present their arguments to the court and for the
court to understand what those arguments are.
Briefs in various jurisdictions have followed common pat-
terns over the years. The initial pattern included the
following:
1. A statement of the case, including a statement of the is-
sues in the trial court, how they were decided and the ques-
tions presented by the appeal.
2. A statement of the facts in narrative form with refer-
ences to pages of the printed record, with references unnec-
129. Youker v. Gulley, 536 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1976). See also Wis. STAT. §
809.16(5) (1977).
130. Davis, The Argument of an Appeal, 26 A.B.A. J. 895 (1940); Wiener, English
and American Appeals Compared, 50 A.B.A. J. 635 (1964). For a complete descrip-
tion of the difference between the appellate process in England and this country, see
generally D. KARLEN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND (1963).
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essary if supplied in the argument portion of the brief.
3. A separate statement of errors (in a law case) or proposi-
tions (in an equity case) relied on by the trial court.
4. In separately numbered divisions for each error or
proposition:
(a) a statement of the error or proposition relied on
in the division, with reference to pages and lines of
printed record to show how the error arose and the rul-
ing of the trial court,
(b) separately numbered brief points, conforming to
the statement of errors or propositions, stating without
argument the grounds of complaint and citing authori-
ties supporting each point, and
(c) the argument on the particular issue.1 3'
This format was confusing and repetitive. There was no
need for a statement of issues in the trial court if they were
not presented in appeal. The statement of facts could not be
checked against the record without a cross reference to the
argument portion of the brief. Repetition of the statements of
error was not helpful, and the listing of authorities at the be-
ginning of the argument, as well as in the argument itself, was
of no aid to the court.
A substantial revision of this format was included in the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure when they were
adopted in 1968. Under the new format the brief was to
include:
1. A table of contents.
2. A statement of issues presented for review.
3. A statement of the case, including a statement of facts.
4. An argument treating each issue identified, with an op-
tional summary of the argument at the beginning of each
argument.
5. A conclusion. 13 2
This format has been found to be simple and easy to un-
derstand by both attorneys and judges, and there appears to
131. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA: A
STUDY OF ITS PROCEDURES AND ADMINISTRATION 64-65 (1971); Comment, Alabama Ap-
pellate Court Congestion: Observations and Suggestions from an Empirical Study,
21 ALA. L. REV. 150, 155 (1968).
132. FED. R. APP. P. 28(a).
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be little improvement that can be made in it. There are, how-
ever, two items which were unnecessary when the revised for-
mat was developed, but which should now be addressed in the
briefs. In the early 1960's when the new rules were developed,
oral argument and a published opinion were 'almost universal.
There was no need, consequently, for the appellate court to
seek the views of the parties on whether there should be oral
argument or a published opinion in a particular case. When a
court found it necessary to curtail one or the other or both, it
did so in a particular case without first asking the parties for
their views on the questions. Whatever may be the merits or
demerits of the limitations on oral argument and publication
of opinions,133 and whatever may be the standards for deter-
mining whether to have them in an individual case, both deci-
sions may have a substantial impact upon the parties. For this
reason the rules should provide that in the briefs the parties
state their views on the need for oral argument and whether
the opinion should be published.3 The parties may not agree
with the court's decision on either question, but at least the
decision is made only after the parties have had an opportu-
nity to express their views to the court.
The appellee's brief should follow the same format as the
appellant's, leaving out only those portions on which there is
no conflict with the appellant.1 3 5 Appellate rules usually per-
mit the appellant to file a reply brief.1 36 Although good brief
writing technique suggests that a reply brief should be fied
only when the appellee raises new matters not addressed in
the appellant's main brief,13 7 many appellate attorneys out of
an abundance of caution will file a reply brief and simply reit-
erate the points made in their first brief. To prevent this it
may be helpful for the appellate rules to state expressly the
limited circumstances under which a reply brief can be fied.
Appellate rules usually, but not always, place a maximum
133. These issues are discussed in section XII, parts B & C infra.
134. Wis. STAT. § 809.19(1)(c) (1977). The 1979 version of FED. R. App. P. 34 re-
quires circuit rules to permit a party to submit a statement why oral argument should
be heard. The Wisconsin system of including the statement in the brief appears
simpler.
135. FED. R. App. P. 28(b).
136. FED. R. App. P. 28(c).
137. E. RE, BRIEF WRITING AND ORAL ARGUMENT 171-72 (4th ed. 1974).
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on the number of pages in a brief.13s This type of rule is an
example of one of the precepts of effective brief writing being
enforced by court rule. Conciseness, or brevity, is universally
regarded as an attribute of a good brief,"3 9 but many attorneys
do not know how to write a good brief, or think that while the
general rule is correct the particular brief the attorney is
working on is an exception. Verbosity is the hallmark of a
poor brief. Even if the page limitation does not improve the
quality of what is written, it will at least reduce the quantity
of what is poorly written. Whatever may have been the justifi-
cation for the page limit in the first place, the caseload pres-
sure on appellate courts and the common practice of judges
reading briefs in advance of oral argument makes such a limit
an imperative.
The page limitation on principal briefs in most jurisdic-
tions is forty to fifty pages. 14 0 It is an unusual case in which
more than forty pages is necessary to set forth the party's po-
sition, and thus the rules should limit the briefs to that num-
ber of pages. There should be a procedure, of course, for ob-
taining permission to file a longer brief, but such requests
should be granted sparingly, otherwise the limitation will ap-
ply only to those who do not bother to request additional
pages.
The printed appendix was originally developed as a means
of saving the substantial expense involved in printing the en-
tire record, while at the same time avoiding the problems of
relying solely on the original record.' 4 ' Experience has shown,
however, that most attorneys are fearful of leaving something
out of the appendix even though the appellate rules may pro-
138. FED. R. APP. P. 28(g). The rules of the United States Supreme Court do not
fix a maximum on the number of pages in a brief.
139. R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 720 (5th ed. 1978); Tate,
The Art of Brief Writing: What a Judge Wants to Read, 4 LITIGATION, Winter, 1978,
at 11. For an evaluation of the Minnesota experience, see Note, The Minnesota Su-
preme Court Prehearing Conference - An Empirical Evaluation, 63 MINN. L. REV.
1221 (1979).
140. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure limit main briefs to 50 printed
pages, FED. R. APP. P. 28(g); Wisconsin limits them to 40 pages, Wis. STAT. §
809.19(8)(c) (1977).
141. Parker, supra note 9, at 6-8; Willcox, Karlen & Roemer, Justice Lost - By
What Appellate Papers Cost, 33 N.Y.U. L. REV. 934, 967-69 (1958); Note, Form of
Appellate Records in Iowa, 48 IOWA L. REV. 77, 87-88 (1962).
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vide that the court can consider anything in the original re-
cord even if not included in the appendix.142 To counteract
this, some courts have returned to the practice of hearing the
case only on the original record and eliminating the filing of
an appendix. 143 To avoid the difficulties of having only one
record that must be used simultaneously by the judges on the
panel hearing the case, the Seventh Circuit has adopted a
rule,144 which provides for the case to be heard on the original
record. The rule further requires a short appendix which must
contain only the judgment or order under review and the trial
court's written or oral opinion, findings and conclusions.
Other matters can but are not required to be included. This
rule appears to be a realistic compromise between keeping the
cost of taking an appeal to the minimum and providing the
appellate court with the materials it needs to make a decision
without undue delay. Given the manner in which most appel-
late courts operate, there is no need for each judge to have a
full copy of the record or even a complete appendix. One copy
of the record for use by the judge who is assigned to write the
opinion in the case is sufficient. The other judges only need
sufficient information to prepare for oral argument or to make
a tentative decision, and the briefs and the short appendix
called for by the Seventh Circuit rule should satisfy that need.
If a judge desires to look at the whole record, it is, of course,
available for that purpose.
Some courts continue to require that the appellant prepare
an abstract of the record.1 45 This is a narrative describing the
contents of the record including the transcript. Other courts
have in the past required a narrative of the transcript but not
of the entire record.146 Neither type of narrative is necessary
and only involves substantial additional cost to the parties
without any equivalent benefit to the appellate court. Those
142. Note, Practice Before the Fifth Circuit, 8 TFtX. TECH. L. REv. 847, 872
(1977).
143. Id. at 878-79.
144. 7TH CIR. R. 12.
145. Smith, Arkansas Appellate Practice: Abstracting the Record, 31 ARK. L.
REv. 359 (1977). Doing away with the abstract of record was one of the recommenda-
tions of the Committee on Simplification and Improvement of Appellate Practice, 63
A.B.A. RE. 602, 606-07 (1938).
146. Note, Form of Appellate Records in Iowa, 48 IowA L. REv. 77 (1962).
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courts which persist in requiring them should learn from the
experience of the great majority of appellate courts who find
themselves perfectly capable of deciding cases expeditiously
without them.
XI. TIME LIMITATIONS AND CONTROL OF THE APPELLATE
PROCESS
It has been recognized for some time that in order for trial
courts to function effectively, they must control the flow of
cases through the court. This control is referred to as case
management. It was discovered that the adversary system was
not a sufficient guarantee for the expeditious disposition of
cases and that the court must assume responsibility for im-
posing time limitations on each successive step in the litiga-
tion process, monitoring compliance with the limitations and
imposing sanctions for failure to comply with the limita-
tions.14 7 Recent studies have shown that of all the possible
variables in the litigation process, the only one which had any
substantial impact upon pace of the litigation process is the
extent to which judges are willing to exercise control over it. 148
Appellate rules have traditionally set time limits on each
step of the appellate process. Except for the time limit on
filing the notice of appeal, however, compliance with these
rules has not been enforced either by the appellate court on
its own initiative or on motion of the opposing party. There
was, consequently, little or no relationship between the time
limits as set forth in the rules and the actual median time
spans between the steps in the appellate process. As appellate
courts began to develop statistics which demonstrated this
fact, they realized that only through the adoption of a case
management system could the entire appellate process be
speeded up and actual median time spans begin to approxi-
mate the time limits as set forth in the rules. The success of
those courts that have implemented case management sys-
tems clearly proves the desirability of each appellate court
147. VOLUME AND DELAY, supra note 23, at 71-74; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 14,
at §§ 3.50-.51; Meador, Appellate Case Management and Decisional Processes, 61
VA. L. REV. 255 (1975).
148. Church, Carlson, Lee & Tan, Justice Delayed: The Pace of Litigation in Ur-
ban Trial Courts, 2 STATE COURTS J. 3 (1978).
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adopting a similar plan.14 9
Appellate courts cannot, of course, simply set and enforce
time limits against the litigants. They must simultaneously
adopt and enforce time limits on their internal procedures.
This means that standards have to be set for the processing of
all petitions and motions, the scheduling of cases for oral ar-
gument or briefs only, the circulation of opinions after sub-
mission and the opinion conference. These internal time lim-
its cannot, of course, be enforced by any formal sanctions, but
the peer pressure resulting from monthly statistics showing
the status of all pending cases and of the cases of each judge
along with encouragement by the chief judge should in all but
extreme cases be sufficient.1
50
XII. THE DISPOSITION PROCESS
A. Prehearing or Summary Disposition
Not all appeals taken to an appellate court are disposed of
on the merits in consecutive order after the briefs have been
filed. Many appeals are disposed of at an earlier stage or, even
if the briefs have been filed, not in the order in which cases
are normally taken. Appeals can be disposed of by voluntary
abandonment by the appellant, as a result of a settlement, by
virtue of a procedural ruling by the appellate court on a mo-
tion, or on the merits, either on a motion by a party or on the
court's own motion.
Dismissal by virtue of a settlement between the parties is
the most attractive from the court's standpoint because no
further action by the court is necessary. The voluntary dismis-
sal by the appellant is almost as attractive but under most
appellate rules approval by the court or by the other parties is
required.15 1 The reason for requiring the approval of the court
or the other parties is apparently a concern that there may be
some disadvantage to the other party if the appellant can dis-
miss at will. This concern does not appear to be valid. The
appellee cannot be prejudiced by the dismissal if he has fied
149. VOLUME AND DELAY, supra note 23, at 71-74; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 14,
at §§ 3.50-.51.
150. R. LEFLAR, R. MARTINEAU & M. SOLOMON, PENNSYLVANIA'S APPELLATE CouRTs
8, 11, 34-54 (1978); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 14, at § 3.52.
151. FED. R. ApP. P. 42.
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a notice of appeal challenging some action of the trial court,
because the dismissal by the appellant cannot affect the ap-
pellee's notice of appeal. If the appellee has not filed a notice
of appeal, all he can do is support the judgment appealed
from, and when there is a voluntary dismissal the appellee has
received all he would be entitled to had the judgment been
affirmed on the merits."6 2 It may be that the appellee would
prefer to have a decision of the appellate court for its prece-
dential effect, but he is no more entitled to that than he
would be to have taken the appeal. There may also be a ques-
tion as to whether the appellee is entitled to recover any costs
for expenses in the appellate court. If that is a problem, the
rules can specifically provide for a motion for costs, even after
the voluntary dismissal, but the dismissal should not be held
up for the sole purpose of making sure the appellee can re-
cover any costs to which he may be entitled.
Settlement has been a traditional means of disposing of
appeals, but until recently settlements had to be reached by
the parties themselves without any aid or encouragement on
the part of the appellate court. This situation was in contrast
to that in the trial courts where the judge often plays a signifi-
cant role in the settlement process. More recently, following
the lead of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit,' a number of federal and state appellate courts have
experimented with having an active or retired member of the
court or a court official meet with the parties to ascertain
whether there are any possibilities of settlement and, if so, to
provide a setting for the settlement to be consummated or, if
no settlement is possible, to attempt to narrow the issues on
appeal.15 4 The evidence to date is not conclusive that the pro-
cedure ultimately aids the appellate process by disposing of
more cases more quickly with less judicial effort than the
traditional hands-off approach.'55 It is necessary, conse-
quently, for more testing and experimentation to occur. While
152. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
153. Kaufman, The Pre-Argument Conference: An Appellate Procedural Reform,
74 COLUM. L. REv. 1094 (1974).
154. VOLUME AND DELAY, supra note 23, at 74-82; Goldman, The Appellate Settle-
ment Conference: An Effective Procedural Reform? 2 STATE COURT J. 3 (1978).
155. Goldman, The Appellate Settlement Conference: An Effective Procedural
Reform? 2 STATE COURT J. 3 (1978).
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the stated theory of the settlement conference is only to pro-
vide an opportunity for the parties to work out a settlement
by themselves with the settlement officer playing no role in
encouraging settlement or suggesting terms, the reality is that
the settlement officer often plays an active rather than passive
role in the settlement process,15 and it is unrealistic to expect
otherwise. Whether the settlement officer should be a judge is
debatable, but in at least one court the settlement officer is an
active member of the appellate court.157 This is a questionable
practice, not only because it reduces the number of judges
available to hear appeals which are not settled, without any
clear evidence that an active judge can settle more cases than
a retired judge or a nonjudge. Further, and of more impor-
tance, any comments by the judge on the state of the law or
on the possible outcome of the appeal may be perceived as
representing the views of the court. This may destroy one of
the essential features of a court-mandated settlement confer-
ence - that the parties believe that their discussions are con-
fidential and no member of the court will be aware of what
has transpired in it. Participation by an active member of the
court may diminish that essential confidence.
Another key feature of the settlement conference is that it
should be held as early in the appellate process as possible,
preferably before there has been any substantial expenditure
of money for the preparation of the transcript or the briefs.
Once the parties have a major financial investment in the ap-
peal, the chances of settlement will be reduced. Absent special
circumstances, the settlement conference should not, however,
be a reason to delay the other steps in the appellate process.
Otherwise, the settlement process can be used as nothing
more than a delaying tactic by the appellant. Nothing will
promote an early settlement better than firm deadlines, after
which a large expenditure of the client's funds would be
required.
Although appellate rules do not usually provide for a mo-
tion to dismiss or a motion for summary disposition, some ap-
156. VOLUME AND DELAY, supra note 23, at 74-75.
157. In the Minnesota Supreme Court a justice of the court conducts the settle-
ment conference. Otis, Prehearing Conferences - A Help or a Hindrance to Appel-
late Litigation? 46 HENN. LAW. 18 (1977).
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pellate courts receive them and act on them.158 A motion to
dismiss is for the purpose of raising procedural questions such
as appealability, timeliness, adequacy of the record or compli-
ance with the appellate rules. A motion for summary dispos-
tion will seek affirmance or reversal on the merits and can be
filed either before or after the briefs are filed. Such motions
are useful in that they permit a case to be diposed of without
the full treatment given to appeals taken under submission in
the ordinary course. To the extent that this procedure can
shorten the time for disposition of appeals with a reduced ex-
penditure of judges' time the procedure is valuable. If the only
thing accomplished is double consideration of most appeals,
both the time for disposition of appeals and the efficient utili-
zation of judicial time will be adversely affected. The rules
should provide for such motions so that attorneys know they
can be filed, but the appellate court should stress that the mo-
tions are appropriate only in appeals which have little merit
to them on one side or the other. 159
The appellate court may also become aware of an appeal
that should be affirmed or reversed summarily. In such an
event, the court should dispose of the case immediately to
avoid further delay and expense for the litigants and to leave
more time for appeals that have merit. Again the appellate
rules should provide for this type of disposition so that the
parties and their attorneys are aware that it can occur.
B. Disposition After Submission on Briefs or Oral
Argument
1. Screening for Oral Argument
Once the briefs have been filed, the appeal is ready to be
taken under submission. Prior to a consideration of the appeal
on the merits, however, many appellate courts now make a
preliminary decision on whether to have oral argument, and
how long it should be.160 In establishing a procedure for mak-
ing this determination, the role of judge and staff must be de-
158. American Orthodontics Corp. v. G. & H. Ins. Agency Inc., 77 Wis. 2d 337, 253
N.W.2d 82 (1977).
159. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 14, at § 3.13(f).
160. VOLUME AND DELAY, supra note 23, at 88-90; ABA TASK FORCE, supra note
128, at part II; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 14, at § 3.32.
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fined, as must the standard upon which the determination is
to be made.
The elimination of oral argument in a substantial number
of cases and nonpublication of opinions are the two major dis-
putes concerning the appellate process in this country. The
elimination of oral arguments in some cases is apparently
based on the assumption that it is necessary to facilitate dis-
position of a greater number of cases.16 1 It also reflects an atti-
tude of many appellate judges that oral argument often is
neither necessary nor useful in aiding the court in reaching a
decision.6 2 The defenders of oral argument in all cases con-
tend, however, that decreasing the number of oral arguments
does not increase the number of appeals a court can effec-
tively handle, and even if it did, the institutional values in
favor of oral argument are so strong that they overcome any
advantages that may be gained from its elimination. 163
It may be that in an ideal world there should be oral argu-
ment in every appeal (though the author's own experience
suggests strongly to the contrary). This is not, however, a per-
fect world, and appellate procedures are of necessity a com-
promise between the ideal and the practical. If it could be
demonstrated that, in fact, elimination of oral argument is not
effective in increasing the number of appeals that can be han-
dled by a court, then the basis for eliminating it would be very
weak. The experience of a number of appellate courts over the
past decade in dramatically increasing the number of appeals
terminated per judge while at the same time sharply reducing
the percentage of appeals in which oral argument is heard
suggests that the former may be in part caused by the lat-
ter.164 Many appellate judges share this same view, as evi-
denced by the many courts which have restricted oral argu-
161. M. OSTHUS & R. SHAPIRO, CONGESTION AND DELAY IN STATE APPELLATE
COURTS 21-24 (1974); Haworth, Screening and Summary Procedures in the United
States Court of Appeals, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 257, 283-87 [hereinafter cited as
Haworth].
162. JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 6, at 19; D. MEADOR, CRIMINAL APPEALS: EN-
GLISH PRACTICES AND AMERICAN REFORMS 80 (1973).
163. COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRuc-
TURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 46-49 (1975); JUSTICE
ON APPEAL, supra note 6, at 16-24; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 14, at § 3.35. See
generally VOLUME AND DELAY, supra note 23, at 90-96.
164. Haworth, supra note 161, at 283-87.
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ment. The contention that the elimination of oral argument in
some cases will not save much judicial time because only a
small percentage of a judge's time is actually spent on the
bench, fails to take into account two things: one, the time
spent by the judges preparing for oral argument which is not
spent on cases decided on briefs only; 65 and two, the difficulty
appellate judges have in completing any other work on the
days on which oral argument is held. As a practical matter
when an appellate court hears oral arguments in four or five
cases a day with thirty minutes allowed each side, the judge
on the panel will accomplish little more that day than to hear
the oral arguments and to hold a conference on those cases. If
the court hears oral arguments one out of every four weeks,
then twenty-five percent of its time is devoted to oral argu-
ment. If oral argument can be eliminated in any substantial
number of cases, judicial time that can be devoted to other
cases can be increased by the amount of time saved on oral
argument.
One suggestion that is designed to reduce the number of
oral arguments but preserve the right to oral argument is for
the appellate court to suggest in a particular case which ap-
pears to have little merit that oral argument is not necessary,
but retaining in either party the option of having oral argu-
ment."6 The weakness in the proposal is that it permits the
attorneys to dictate to the court the procedures which are to
be followed. We have long since abandoned the concept that
the courts exist simply to do the bidding of the parties and
that control over the case is in the hands of the parties rather
than the court.167 The court must have control over its own
docket and procedures, and this is not achieved if the ques-
tion of oral argument is to be determined by the parties.
There also appears to be little justification for oral argument
in a case which the appellate court, after reviewing the briefs,
found to be without merit.16
8
Appellate courts differ on whether judges or staff should
perform the screening for oral argument.169 To the extent that
165. Id.
166. JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 6, at 21-24.
167. See authorities cited in note 128 supra.
168. The 1979 amendment to FED. R. APP. P. 34 adopts this position.
169. MEADOR, supra note 1, at 33-34; VOLUME AND DELAY, supra note 23, at 89.
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judges are involved in the screening process, the judicial time
saved by elimination of oral argument is reduced. To the ex-
tent that staff rather than judges make the decision, the role
of the judge in the judicial process is reduced.170 Even though
allowing staff to make the decision on oral argument may re-
duce the role of the judge in the appellate process, the key is
that it does not reduce the role of the judge in the decision
process. The question of oral argument does not involve the
merits of the case, except indirectly, and thus is the type of
decision that can best be assigned to staff. If the amount of
judicial time devoted to a case is to be reduced, there must be
some matters for which staff, rather than the judge, are as-
signed responsibility. The important thing is for the judge to
retain exclusive responsibility for deciding the appeal on the
merits. All preliminary matters such as procedural motions
and screening can be assigned to staff without reducing judi-
cial responsibility for the ultimate decision.171
It is important that the judges, the staff, and the attorneys
know the standards which the court uses for determining
whether oral argument is to be held. The standards should,
consequently, be included in the appellate rules. There have
been several attempts to state the standards for oral argu-
ment.17 2 Basically, oral argument should be for the purpose of
aiding the court in reaching a decision. That is, of course, no
meaningful standard itself. Oral argument can be eliminated
either because the briefs indicate there is no merit to the ap-
peal and oral argument would be a waste of time, or that the
briefs present such a clear picture of the case that oral argu-
ment would be superfluous. These standards will be the focus
of the section of the brief which addresses the issue of the
170. Bird, The Hidden Judiciary, 17 JUDGES J. 4 (1978). For a reply to Chief
Justice Bird, see Cooley, Neutralizing the Threat of the Hidden Judiciary, 18
JUDGES J. 44 (1979).
171. MEADOR, supra note 1, at 175-93; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 14, at § 3.62.
See also Reynolds & Richman, Limited Publication in the Fourth and Sixth Cir-
cuits, 1979 DUKE L.J. 807; Reynolds & Richman, Nonprecedential Precedent - Lim-
ited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1978).
172. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a); Wis. STAT. § 809.22 (1977); COMMISSION ON REVISION OF
THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: REC-
OMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 46-49 (1975); JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 6, at 19-24;
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 14, at § 3.35.
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need for oral argument.
2. The Decision Process
The internal decision process of appellate courts have only
recently been given substantial attention.17 3 The significant
relationship between the decision process and the decision it-
self is now recognized and, of course, the relationship between
the process and the productivity of the court is also acknowl-
edged. Notwithstanding the lack of information on the inter-
nal decision processes of appellate courts, for many years
there were basic patterns to the processes of the various
courts. These similarities broke down as different courts be-
gan experiencing substantial variations in the number of ap-
peals being heard. Beginning in the late 1930's under the lead-
ership of Arthur Vanderbilt and John J. Parker, a consensus
began to develop as to the best internal decision process for
an appellate court to follow. In 1976 Robert Leflar published a
book on the internal operating procedures of appellate courts
in which procedures used by appellate courts throughout the
country were described and examined. 174
There were three basic features of the traditional decision
making process which had a substantial adverse impact upon
the quality of the work of the appellate court. The first was
the conscious decision not to read the briefs or make other
preparation for oral argument. The theory was that the judges
should enter upon oral argument with no preconceived no-
tions about the case, thus permitting the oral argument of
counsel to have the greatest impact. 75 The only exception to
the no-preparation practice was the one judge who was as-
signed the case prior to oral argument. This pre-assignment
was the second feature of the former decision making process.
Under it, some time prior to oral argument the case would be
173. The most comprehensive treatment of internal operating procedures is found
in R. LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS (1976). For a
listing of other reports and articles see ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 128, at 103-04.
The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court System has called for appellate
courts to appoint advisory bodies on internal operating procedures and to publish the
procedures adopted. STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
CHANGE 44-46 (1975).
174. LEFLAR, supra note 24.
175. Parker, supra note 9, at 11.
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assigned to a single judge and he would receive copies of the
briefs and the record. He would have primary responsbility
for asking questions of counsel during oral argument and of
leading the discussion during the decision conference. 176 The
third feature of the old process was that the other members of
the court were concerned only with the decision of the court,
and the opinion written by the judge to whom the case was
assigned was given little if any consideration by the other
members of the court.1" An extreme but common example of
this was the fact that in many courts, copies of the draft opin-
ion were not distributed to the members of the court but the
opinion was read to them at a conference which provided their
only opportunity to suggest changes.1 7 1 The obvious result of
these three procedures was a decision that was to some degree
collegial, but an opinion that was essentially the product of
one person and not of the entire court.
It is now recognized that both the decision and the opinion
in a case must be collegial products of the entire court 79 and
that advance preparation by the judges is an aid rather than
interference with meaningful oral argument.180 Some judges
still do not read the briefs in advance, not so much because of
a disagreement with the desirability of doing it, but because
of a heavy workload. 18 To insure that all judges prepare
equally for oral argument, some courts now do not assign
cases to individual judges until after a tentative decision is
made. 82 This also prevents the members of the court from
relying too heavily upon one judge who has read the briefs
and had access to the record. The most significant change has
been in the greater opportunity for review of opinions written
by other judges. Modern photocopying machines have made
distribution of copies of opinions a simple matter, and the
availability of law clerks has provided the staff support neces-
176. LEFLAR, supra note 24, at 40.
177. Parker, supra note 1, at 10-11.
178. LEFLAR, supra note 24, at 53.
179. JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 6, at 29-31; LEFLAR, supra note 24, at 36-39;
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 14, at § 3.36.
180. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 14, at § 3.34(c).
181. R. LEFLAR, R. MARTINEAU & M. SOLOMON, PENNSYLVANIA'S APPELLATE COURTS
5 (1978).
182. VOLUME AND DELAY, supra note 23, at 102; LEFLAR, supra note 24, at 39-41;
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 14, at § 3.54 (Commentary).
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sary for the task."'3 For some inexplicable reason, there are
some courts and judges that still do not recognize that it is
the published opinion of the court that is its most important
product, and they continue to devote their principal effort to
the decision and virtually ignore the content of the opinion.
This situation appears, however, to be changing rapidly as
more and more attention is given to the decision process.
C. Publication of Opinions
During the past decade many appellate courts began to re-
strict the number of cases in which full opinions were pre-
pared and to limit the number of opinions which were pub-
lished either officially or unofficially.1 84 Usually the two
limitations go together, that is, only full opinions are pub-
lished and the shorter opinions, usually called memorandu'm
or per curiam opinions, are not published. Various standards
have been developed for determining those opinions to be
published, 8 5 but essentially the question is whether the opin-
ion is simply repetitive of earlier published opinions and adds
nothing to the body of law, because it neither involves a new
legal principle nor applies an established principle to an un-
usual factual situation. s
The basic justifications for the two limitations on opinions
is that the number of opinions being published is so great that
legal research is impaired and the cost of keeping up to date
with the flood of opinions is prohibitive.18 7 The principal argu-
ments to the contrary are that anything which a common-law
court does is part of the body of law, that judicial accountabil-
ity is reduced when opinions are not written or published, and
that courts may attempt to hide their decisions in unwritten
and unpublished opinions.18  The debate has waxed long and
hot with neither side convincing the other.8 9 Notwithstanding
183. LEFLAR, supra note 24, at 29-30, 53-54.
184. Chanin, A Survey of the Writing and Publication of Opinions in Federal
and State Appellate Courts, 67 LAW LIS. J. 362 (1974).
185. Id.
186. VOLUME AND DELAY, supra note 23, at 98.
187. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON APPELLATE JUSTICE, STANDARDS FOR PUBLICATION OF JU-
DICIAL OPINIONS 5-8 (1973).
188. JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 6, at 35-41.
189. Most of the articles are listed in ABA TASK FORCE, supra note 128, at 125-26.
See also Smith, The Selective Publication of Opinions: One Court's Experience, 32
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the objections, however, the courts, who control the situation,
have made it clear that they intend to continue to limit the
publication of opinions.
As to the desirability of having a statement of reasons in
every case decided on the merits, there can be little doubt.190
The preparation of an opinion, even if not published,
assures some measure of thoughtful review of the facts in a
case and of the law's bearing upon them. Snap judgments
and lazy preferences for armchair theorizing as against li-
brary research and time-consuming cerebral effort are some-
what minimized. The checking of holdings in cases cited, the
setting down of reasons in a context of comparison with
competing reasons, the answering of arguments seriously
urged, and the announcement of a conclusion that purport-
edly follows from the analysis set out in the opinion are an-
tidotes to casualness and carelessness in decision. They com-
pel thought. It is even necessary that the thought have some
quality of rigorousness in it.119
Having a written opinion also assures the parties that the
court has given their case a reasonable amount of attention
and the case has not been decided by mistake or oversight.
It is quite another matter, however, to say that because an
opinion is written it must be published. First, an opinion that
is written primarily for the parties and is simply a reasoned
explanation of the court's decision is very likely not to be the
same type of opinion that is written for publication.19 2 Sec-
ond, the reasons for writing an opinion in every case are com-
pletely separate from the reasons for publishing an opinion.
An opinion is published because it serves as the means by
which the appellate court performs its law development func-
tion. Because it is an essential part of law development that
the bar and the public be made aware of what the law is or
will be, that function can only be served if the opinion is pub-
ARK. L. REV. 26 (1978); Walther, The Noncitation Rule and the Concept of Stare
Decisis, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 581 (1978); Comment, A Snake in the Path of the Law:
The Seventh Circuit's Non-Publication Rule, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 309 (1977).
190. JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 6, at 31-32; ABA STANDARDS, supra note 14,
at § 3.36(b). Contra, VOLUME AND DELAY, supra note 23, at 97.
191. Leflar, Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions, 61 COLUM. L. REV.
810, 810 (1961).
192. VOLUME AND DELAY, supra note 23, at 98.
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lished. If an opinion does not develop the law but only applies
previously developed law to unexceptional circumstances,
there does not appear to be any overriding reason to publish
it.
The most serious objection to the nonpublication rule is
that courts may be tempted to cover up decisions inconsistent
with prior published opinions. Some instances of the misuse
of nonpublication have been cited,19 and no doubt there will
be additional instances in the future. The only systematic sur-
vey of one state's intermediate appellate court experience
with nonpublication has indicated that the rule has not been
abused and that there were few opinions that should have
been published but were not.""
One provision that should be included in a rule on publica-
tion would authorize anyone at any time to petition the court
to publish an opinion. This would allow anyone who thinks
that the opinion breaks new ground to point out to the court
why he thinks it does and to seek to have the opinion pub-
lished. It will also allow a person who subsequently wants to
cite the opinion to be able to have it published.19 5
The principal basis for the objection to the nonpublication
of an opinion is the prohibition against citing the unpublished
opinion. 9 ' Part of this objection is eliminated if publication
can be requested even after the original nonpublication deci-
sion. The ultimate justification of the noncitation rule is, how-
ever, that without it the nonpublication rule would be mean-
ingless and unenforceable, and the problems of legal research
would be compounded rather than eased. This is because it is
inevitable that even if an opinion is not published officially, if
it can be cited the opinion will soon be published unofficially.
When that occurs anyone doing legal research must then
check not only the official reports but also the unofficial re-
ports, thereby complicating and making more expensive his
task. The prohibition on the citation of unpublished opinions
193. JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 6, at 38; Gardner, Ninth Circuit's Unpub-
lished Opinions: Denial of Equal Justice? 61 A.B.A. J. 1224 (1975); Seligson & War-
nloff, The Use of Unreported Cases in California, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 37 (1972).
194. Mueller, Unpublished Opinion Study, 1 STATE COURT J. 23 (1977).
195. 7th CIR. R. 35(d); Wis. STAT. § 809.23(4) (1977).
196. JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 6, at 38-39; Walther, The Noncitation Rule
and the Concept of Stare Decisis, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 581 (1978).
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must, consequently, be part of any rule limiting publication of
opinions.
D. Rehearing
Almost all appellate rules provide for some form of motion
for rehearing in an appellate court.197 Rehearing is thought
necessary to give the court an opportunity to correct a mis-
take it has made. Rehearing is clearly necessary in the juris-
diction's highest court because there is no place else to go. Re-
hearing in an intermediate appellate court, whether
mandatory or permissive, is at best a waste of time, expense,
and judicial energy, and at worst another means for a litigant
to delay the inevitable. A different result on rehearing is so
rare' 98 that there can be no justification for it even on a per-
missive basis. If an intermediate appellate court has made a
mistake, let the mistake be corrected in the only court likely
to find the mistake, the highest court in the jurisdiction. Per-
mitting or requiring a rehearing motion in the lower court
gains nothing and costs much.
A different problem arises when an intermediate appellate
court sits in panels of three but is composed of many more
judges.199 Should the court also sit en banc to reconsider deci-
sions made by panels? The only reason to do so would be to
eliminate conflicts between decisions of panels. But that func-
tion should be performed by the supreme court, not the inter-
mediate appellate court sitting en banc. The latter court
should not sit en banc, and thus there is no reason to have a
motion for rehearing en banc. 200
XIII. CONCLUSION
The model appellate process proposed in this article has
two underlying tenets. First, each aspect of the appellate pro-
cess is interrelated and should not be considered in isolation.
Second, the process must be simple to comprehend and com-
ply with, and be uniformly applied.
197. LEFLAR, supra note 24, at 60-61.
198. Louisell & Degnan, Rehearing in American Appellate Courts, 44 CALIF. L.
REV. 627 (1956).
199. JUSTICE ON APPEAL, supra note 6, at 161-64.
200. This discussion is probably inapplicable to the federal appellate system be-
cause of the volume of cases decided annually by the courts of appeals.
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Principally, the model proposed here is intended to pro-
vide an example for those concerned with improving or imple-
menting appellate process in a particular jurisdiction. The
dual function of error correction and law development should
be facilitated by a process which balances the goal of justice
with the goal of developing consistent and general legal prin-
ciples. Specific suggestions for achieving these goals are sum-
marized below.
A. Appellate Court Size
The number of judges needed depends upon caseload. Op-
timum workload for an intermediate court judge is about one
hundred cases annually; for a supreme court justice with only
discretionary jurisdiction, twenty written opinions. A supreme
court justice working without an intermediate level court
should be responsible for about twenty error correcting and
twenty law development cases per year.
B. Structure and Location of Intermediate Court
An intermediate court ideally should be a single court for
the entire jurisdiction and should sit at only one location. As a
compromise to the litigants' economy and convenience, a sin-
gle court could provide several panels located throughout a ju-
risdiction, but judges and staff members themselves should
not have to travel to different sites to hold court sessions.
C. Right of Appeal and Appealability
One appeal as of right should be available, preferably to an
intermediate court. Review by the supreme court should be
entirely in the court's own discretion. Appeals of right should
extend only to final orders or judgments. Supervisory writs
should not be employed as a means of interlocutory appeal.
D. Procedural Requirements to Bring an Appeal
Appellate procedural requirements should be as simple as
possible, should not shift burdens onto litigants that properly
belong on the trial court staff, and should also be strictly en-
forced, with few if any exceptions. Parties should not be per-
mitted to raise issues on appeal not raised below by objection.
An appellate court should not raise an issue not properly
raised by a party, except possibly when it is a relevant law
[Vol. 63:163
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development issue that appeared foreclosed by precedent.
E. Proper Parties
A nonparticipant or an "informal" participant in the trial
court should not be permitted as an appellate party without
proper intervention as a proper party. A person attacking any
portion of a judgment should file a notice of appeal or cross-
appeal, jointly or individually.
F. Initiation of Appeal
There should be a uniform length of time in which a notice
of appeal may be filed following the judgement; thirty days is
suggested. Defects in notice, such as failing to serve a party
with a copy of the notice of appeal, should not result in auto-
matic dismissal of the appeal. But the notice rules should not
degenerate into a mere actual notice requirement, although it
may result in a dismissal as to one party.
G. Docket and Record
Full control over the appeal should be vested in the appel-
late court as soon as the notice of appeal is filed. The trial
court clerk should be responsible, upon filing of the notice of
appeal and payment of the appeal fee, for assembling the re-
cord, and answerable to the appellate court for delay in for-
warding the fee, notice and the record.
Appellant should order the transcript and should file in
the appellate court a statement indicating, (1) that appellant
has ordered the transcript, (2) that payment arrangements
have been made, and (3) the date for completion. Extensions
should be sought directly by the court reporter and granted
only by the appellate court.
H. Briefs
A brief should be simply structured to include a table of
contents, a statement of the issues, a statement of the case,
the argument and a conclusion. A brief should be limited to
forty pages in length with few exceptions. A reply brief may
be filed by the appellant only to respond to new matters
raised in appellee's brief. Appendices should include only the
judgment or order under review and the trial court's written
or oral opinion, findings and conclusions, and any particular
19791
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relevant portion of the record.
L Time Limitations and Case Management
The appellate court system should adopt a case manage-
ment system. Time standards should be established for the
court's own processing. For each case, the court should sched-
ule times for oral argument, submission and consideration,
circulation of opinions and the opinion conference.
J. Voluntary Disposition
Disposition by appellant's voluntary dismissal should not
require approval by the court or of the other parties; nor
should it be delayed by the court to insure that a party can
recover costs. Justices sitting on the court should not be in-
volved in the settlement process, but settlement should be en-
couraged and should occur as early as possible following trial
court resolution.
K. Summary Disposition
Summary disposition may result from consideration of a
procedural motion, the court's own screening process or a mo-
tion for summary disposition on the merits. A motion for
summary disposition should be permitted under the appellate
rules only when there is little merit on one side, thereby viti-
ating double attention to the case.
L. Oral Argument
Oral argument should be severely restricted. It can be to-
tally eliminated when the briefs indicate there is no merit on
one side, or when the briefs present such a clear picture that
oral argument would be superfluous.
M. Decision Process
A case should not be assigned to a judge until after a ten-
tative decision is made. Judges should prepare for each oral
argument by reading the briefs. Opinions should be circulated
in draft form and result from collegial effort representing the
work of the court.
N. Written Opinions
A written opinion should be produced in every case. How-
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ever, an opinion that does not develop law, but merely applies
existing law, need not be published. An unpublished decision
should not be cited as authority; however, anyone at any time
should be able to petition to have an opinion published.
0. Rehearings
The highest court in a jurisdiction should provide a re-
hearing mechanism. Intermediate courts should not have a re-
hearing mechanism, either by panel or en banc.
The model proposed in this article is not, except in a few
instances, original with the author. It is based to a large de-
gree upon the American Bar Association Standards of Judicial
Administration Relating to Appellate Courts, the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure and other appellate reforms re-
cently adopted in Wisconsin, which in turn find their genesis
in the ideas of Pound, Sunderland, Parker and Vanderbilt.
There is in the appellate process, as in war and politics, little
new or original. There is only the refinement and reassertion
of basically sound ideas to deal with the essential problem of
providing justice economically and expeditiously to the liti-
gants and to the public.
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